The International Studies Association is holding its Annual Convention for 2014 in Toronto, Canada.
Below is one proposal I have submitted for consideration by the International Political Economy and International Security sections:
Geopolitical Flashpoints, Systemic Risk & Distal-Influenced Spatiality
Abstract: Geopolitical flashpoints and systemic risk are now global arbitrage opportunities for hedge funds and political risk firms. Bridgewater (Ray Dalio), AQR Capital Management (Aaron C. Brown), PIMCO (Bill Gross & Mohamed El-Erian), Roubini Global Economics (Nouriel Roubini), and Stratfor (George Friedman & Robert D. Kaplan) have each contributed to media, policy, and practitioner debates about the 2008-10 rare earths bubble, the United States pivot toward Asia, and Iran-Syria-Russia oil speculation. This paper uses develops a Bayesian inference framework which emphasizes distal (far away) and spatial cause-effect relationships, in order to explain how hedge funds and political risk firms as non-state actors can enact global arbitrage and actively influence/shape public debates. I integrate analytical research from the sociology of finance (Donald MacKenzie), international security (Stephen G. Brooks), critical world security (Michael T. Klare & Naomi Klein), intelligence studies (Amy B. Zegart, Robert Jervis, & Gregory Treverton), hedge funds (Andrew Busch & Andrew Lo), and fictional speculation (Richard K. Morgan), to develop a new, inductive theory-building alternative to current explanations that emphasize proximate (near) and temporal causes. This paper advances new understanding about ‘casino capitalism’ (Susan Strange), expert networks, hedge fund activism, and political risk arbitrage.
You can blame George Soros for making hedge funds the dark horse of the irrationally exuberant 1990s.
As the public face of the Quantum Group of Funds, Soros gained notoriety for short selling the English pound in September 1992 and allegedly making $1 billion in profits. Adam Curtis observes in his riveting documentary The Mayfair Set (BBC, 1999) that Soros’ victory signalled the first time that market speculators had beaten a country’s central bank. In the aftermath Soros cultivated a master trader persona based on his personal ‘theory of reflexivity’ or how ‘participant’s bias’ can shape our actions in and perceptions of market events. Hedge fund chic arose in Wall Street as investment banks rushed to found hedge funds, which use leverage and pooled capital to manage assets, derivatives and securities for an investor group.
Financialistas however are showing signs of buyers’ remorse as subprime turbulence brings an end to Soros-inspired hedge fund chic. The high-profile collapse of Bear Stearns‘ two hedge funds in mid 2007 was only a precursor, Hedge Fund Research notes, of 170 liquidated in early 2008. The survivors have adopted Soros’ global macro strategy which relies on computational finance and dynamical models of currencies, interest rates and other macroeconomic factors to achieve returns.
Global macro is a risky strategy for several reasons: it requires forecasting models of complex interactions, computing power and fund mangers with impeccable judgment for asset allocation. In fact global macro deals with a specific risk class known as systemic risk that results from business cycles and macroeconomic movements, thus it cannot be diversified away. Add funds’ massive leverage of pooled securities, industry secrecy, little government regulation and hypercompetition between different funds and managers, and an accurate calculation of risk-return is difficult. These challenges overshadow the potential of applied research solutions, such as Fritz Zwicky‘s morphological analysis, a problem-solving method which deals with ‘multi-dimensional, non-quantifiable problems’ – relevant to the macroeconomic factors and systemic risk in global macro strategies.
Hedge fund chic faces several other problems. As an investment category hedge funds have matured and their combination of high leverage and high management fees are unsuitable for many non-institutional investors. Subprime fallout is triggering change in US financial and regulatory institutions which will inevitably lead to more rules and regulatory oversight of edge funds and managers. Internally, hedge funds also need to separate managerial processes (principal management, portfolio execution) from financial reporting (mark to market book) and governance (board, corporate and policies & procedures).
Which means despite Soros’ alchemical touch hedge fund chic may now be a fad.
Could the roots of the 2007 subprime crisis in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) lie in financial analysts who all used similar assumptions and forecasts in their quantitative models?
Barron’s Bill Alpert argues so, pointing to a shift of investment styles after the 2000 dotcom crash from sector-specific, momentum and growth stocks to value investing. Investment managers who prefer the value approach then constructed their portfolios with ‘stocks that were cheap relative to their book value.’ In other words, the value investors exploited several factors — the gaps in asset valuation, asymmetries in public and private information sources, price discovery mechanisms and market participants — which contributed to mispriced stocks compared to their true value.
However, the value investing strategy had a blindspot: many of the stocks selected for investment portfolios also had a high exposure to credit and default risk. The 2007 subprime crisis exposed this blindspot, which adversely affected value investors whose portfolios had stocks with a high degree of positive covariance.
Alpert quotes hedge fund manager Rick Bookstaber who believes that financial engineers have accelerated crises and systemic risks via the complex dynamics of new futures contracts, exotic options and swaps. These new financial instruments create interlocking markets (capital, commodities, debt, equity, treasuries) which have the second-order effects of larger yield curve spreads and trading volatility. Alpert and Bookstaber’s views echo Susan Strange‘s warnings a decade ago of ‘casino capitalism’ and ‘mad money’ as unconstrained forces in the international political economy.
Quantitative models also failed to foresee the 2007 subprime crisis due to excessive leverage, difficulties to achieve ‘alpha’ or above-market returns in market volatility, and the separation of risk management from the modelling process and testing. Other commentators have raised the first two errors, which have led to changes in portfolio construction and market monitoring. Nassim Nicholas Taleb has built a second career on the third error, with his Black Swan conjecture of high-impact events, randomness and uncertainty (see Taleb’s Long Now Foundation lecture The Future Has Always Been Crazier Than We Thought).
Alpert hints that these three errors may lead to several outcomes: (1) a new ‘arms race’ between investment managers to find the new ‘factors’ in order to construct resilient investment portfolios; (2) the integration of Taleb’s second-order creative thinking and risk management in the construction of financial models, in new companies and markets such as George Friedman’s risk boutique Stratfor; and (3) a new ‘best of breed’ manager who can make investment decisions in a global and macroeconomic environment of correlated and integrated financial markets.