5th December 2011: Buy Ben Eltham Lunch

Ben Eltham (New Matilda; Crikey)

Ben Eltham is a prolific Australian writer and commentator on national affairs, arts and politics for New Matilda, Crikeyand other online publications.

You can support Eltham’s writing here — I urge you to do so.

Eltham and I have co-written a number of academic journal articles and conference papers, on Twitter and Iran’s 2009 election (PDF and presentation PDF); Australia’s Film Finance corporation and international tax arbitrage (PDF); and on the 2009 Victorian bushfires and journalism (PDF). Our joint paper on Twitter and Iran remains our most academically cited article. Along with his New Matilda and Crikey work, this should convey Eltham’s talent.

Twitterati can follow Eltham here whilst his Google Scholar profile is here.

3rd December 2011: On Your Own Terms

Foo Fighters (1995)

 

Dave Grohl‘s career holds an important lesson for me. After Nirvana‘s dissolution, he developed Foo Fighters as a side-project and then as a full band. He established a completely new creative environment and gained commercial success on his own terms. He refused to live in Nirvana’s shadow. He even acknowledged his hardcore punk and metal roots with the Probot collaborative project. Grohl was able to show how through persistence, strategic thinking, and execution, the creative individual can succeed instead of becoming institutionalised. You don’t necessarily need a large organisation if you establish the appropriate structures, which Grohl did.

 

It’s a lesson I use daily in my creative, research projects.

2nd December 2011: The Disruptive Internet

Disruptive Internet project files (partial), January 2007 (click to view)

 

From January 2006 to March 2007 I worked on The Disruptive Internet (uncompleted) project for the Smart Internet Technology CRC.

 

The project had four goals:

 

1. Prepare a research critique that offers the first consolidated analysis of Internet-related disruptive technologies and users with some key implications for commercial opportunities.

2. Construct a taxonomy of disruptive users.

3. Validation or debunking of the hypothesis that the best future applications will not necessarily succeed because they offer higher levels of technology performance but rather consumers perceive them as practical and affordable, with obvious usefulness in their lives as low tech/high touch applications.

4. Identification of market disruption opportunities and evaluation of their implications for CRC Participants in various industry sectors.

 

I’ve just re-read the program director’s negative final assessment in the SITCRC’s 2007 annual report and want to set the record straight in a minority report/rejoinder:

 

1.The first milestone is listed as achieved. I had a draft monograph (redrafted twice with new material) on Clayton M. Christensen‘s research program on disruptive innovation, and another on Google (mentioned in this 2010 blog post). Although I spent a year on it, this material has never been made publicly available. It currently fills an archive box and over 3 gigabytes on a hard drive. At the time, I saw a marketplace gap now filled by The Innovator’s Guide to Growth (2008) and The Innovator’s DNA (2011). Perhaps I should have pursued a book deal. A public, official internet blog would also have been interesting given my concurrent work with The Disinformation Company Ltd. The two unpublished, draft monographs influenced a 2008 conference paper (PDF) and presentation (PDF) on disruptive innovation markets and ‘freemium’ music digital downloads.

 

2. The second milestone is listed as not achieved. For the second milestone, I had a draft taxonomy which drew on the Chinese 36 strategems. In my redrafted material for the first milestone, I also emphasised the link between disruptive innovation and agile software development as a type of disruptive user environment (‘reversing’-driven innovation was another). I undertook Scrum training in 2005, not CRC-funded. I took usability and project management training in 2006, not CRC-funded. In January 2007, the SITCRC listed (archived here) my public blog, which also touched on this milestone. Finally, I made explicit links between counter-terrorism and disruptive users, such as for a 2006 Masters  paper that evaluated DARPA’s Total Information Awareness initiative (PDF). However, I found that this perspective was off-limits in the SITCRC, and I was censured several times during Q&A sessions.

 

3. The third milestone is listed as not achieved. A senior SITCRC staff member proposed the third milestone. They did not elaborate further, so work didn’t proceed. I did not have the hypothesis-driven research training at the time to carry this milestone out. There was no null hypothesis given. There are framing problems with how the original hypothesis was formulated.

 

4. The fourth milestone is listed as not achieved. This is incorrect. I did several SITCRC presentations and workshops for Westpac and Sensis (PowerPoint presentation here from a December 2006 session) which had ‘commercial in confidence’ discussion of my research program and specific issues that each company faced. I also worked on a project with SITCRC member The Distillery at the request of the SITCRC’s chief executive officer. I noted opportunities featured in news stories in a public blog. I emphasised the role of environmental scanning, opportunity evaluation, strategic foresight and strategic intelligence as organisational capabilities for disruptive innovation.  I provided specific guidance for the Smart Services CRC successful bid, which subsequently led to a new, $A120 million dollar research consortium.

 

Courtesy of Rosie X, I even had a personal project intranet that SITCRC staff could access, with internal interviews and other draft materials.

 

The SITCRC’s annual report concludes that The Disruptive Internet project “will not be completed” by June 2007 and thus the “contract of researcher not extended.”

 

What actually happened:

 

(1) In February 2007, the SITCRC’s senior management decided to cut staff, despite the success of the Smart Services CRC bid. The university-based team I was on would possibly be cut from three to two researchers. The SITCRC’s chief executive officer and most of the senior people who comprised the bid team also left the organisation. (I later learned after studying mergers and acquisitions that this is common during the post-merger integration phase.)

 

(2) There had been infra-team personality conflicts on my research team for over a year previously (which did negatively impact on my work). I was unable to get my program manager’s approval to publish material that was more suited to theory-building academic journals than to non-peer reviewed industry reports. (I also had the support of several SITCRC commercial partners.) At the time, in late 2006 and early 2007 there  were uncertainties regarding if the Smart Services CRC bid would be successful. I felt certain team members narrowly prioritised their work in new project proposals and claimed professional expertise which they did not have — which in turn raised ethical and professional dilemmas for me. I raised these issues via SITCRC and university processes for research disputes. The SITCRC deferred to the university process.

Two days after I did raised the research dispute, the program manager (who later wrote the negative review) told me that my contract — which ended in a week — would not be renewed. This pre-empted the faculty and university processes for handling and resolving research disputes. No alternative dispute resolution mechanisms were made available. This ended my potential involvement in the Smart Services CRC, which I had worked for months on the successful bid for, and contributed to the conceptualisation of its research programs.

 

There were other more constructive avenues ways to have resolved these issues. The SITCRC’s 2006-07 annual report’s assessment does not reflect these complexities, of course. The whole negative experience led me to raise some research management issues in the Australian Government’s 2008 Review of the National Innovation System and Review of the CRCs Program.

 

My CV (PDF) and Publications (PDF and archive) detail subsequent non-CRC research. Since the SITCRC, I have worked on a sensitive university-wide audit; helped research teams to get Australian Research Council Linkage grants and funds from other competitive sources; and co-published in A-level peer reviewed academic journals. My personal research is now more highly cited (here) than the jointly-authored research I did in the SITCRC.

25th November 2011: Reconstructing Disinfo.com Dossier Archives

I recently started a Google Scholar personal profile. I spent a day importing most of my academic publication history from the past decade. (There are a few gaps, such as some unpublished work I did on Clayton Christensen and Google for the Smart Internet Technology CRC in 2006-07. I’m reworking that material for peer reviewed journal articles.)

The biggest challenge was what to do with my Disinformation material, which was never peer-reviewed nor published in an academic journal.

I edited the site on a daily basis in two stints: November 1999 to August 2002, and April 2003 to February 2008. I took over from co-founder Richard Metzger who had launched the site on 13th September 1996, and Russ Kick took over from me in the interim, before launching his Alternewswire project. The first period is archived here whilst The Wayback Machine has a snapshot of Disinfo.com’s historical evolution here.

21C publisher/editor Ashley Crawford put me in contact with Metzger in mid-1998 after an RU Sirius profile. Metzger suggested I write some dossiers – partly as a therapeutic outlet to get over 21C‘s print demise and a messy relationship break-up. I emailed him profiles of Anton LaVey, George Gurdjieff, memetic engineering and space migration. When Razorfish acquired The Disinformation Company, Metzger and publisher Gary Baddeley tapped me to edit the site whilst they worked on the Disinfo Nation series for the United Kingdom’s Channel 4. 2000 and 2001 were my most productive years.

By mid-2002 I was burnt out and had turned to archival material from my La Trobe University student newspaper Rabelais, 21C and other sources. I also experimented with event-driven news reportage using lessons from information visualisation, values systems theory, media studies and political science. One day whilst drafting a dossier on the philosopher Peter Ouspensky I realised that I just couldn’t write anymore. Metzger and Baddeley had watched the content decline and reached a similar conclusion.

When he took over the daily editing responsibilities, Russ Kick brought a different, current issues sensibility to the site (Metzger excelled as a curator which he continues to do at his new project Dangerous Minds). My 2003-2008 period shifted away from writing original material to daily news coverage, as I completed graduate school and worked full-time as a researcher for the Smart Internet Technology CRC. Baddely wanted the site to be more blog-like and user-driven. I wrote a final editorial message to Disinformation’s readers that summed up the new user-driven direction, which the site continues with today.

I never kept a daily list of the specific dates that dossiers were published on. We lost several dossiers during site transfers. The early content management platforms did not have the functionality of today’s WordPress and Movable Type blogs. For instance, there were no version control or  rollback features, so articles may have been published at earlier dates than the current site version might suggest. From 1998 to 2002 I did compile an editorial master list of possible topics for the freelance contributors to explore, keyed to an old site topic structure: the Disinformation archives are thus only one of several possible sites that could have eventuated over the 1998-2003 period.

I am reconstructing a timeline of rough year dates, in order to get the bibliographic and citation data of the Disinformation dossiers and articles archived in Google Scholar (and possibly into Swinburne University’s research bank). The initial printout of the relevant dossiers and articles comes to 5 pages — larger in size than the academic research I’ve subsequently done. The material varies from excellent to failed experiments and deadline-driven messes.

It feels strange to re-engage with this material for archival and citation purposes — it feels like another lifetime ago.

23rd November 2011: Google Scholar Personal Profiles

Google Scholar has announced open citations and personal profiles.

The service is popular with academics for citation analysis and publication track records. Google Scholar’s data collection is messy: it trawls the internet and gathers citations from a range of websites and sources. It does not yet have the rigour of Elsevier’s Scopus database, for example. However, it is likely to outrank such proprietary services, due to Google’s accessibility and popularity.

My Google Scholar profile is here. For now, it is a highly selective collection — academic journal articles and conference papers, some postgraduate and undergraduate essays, and old Disinformation dossiers (see archives). I was surprised that some long-forgotten articles had been internationally cited. I have a more complete publications profile which gets updated as new academic research is published (PDF).

Several past collaborators — Axel Bruns, Ben Eltham & Jose Ramos — have their own profiles, and you should check out their personal research programs.

24th October 2011: Stephen Walt on the Social Sciences

Harvard’s Stephen Walt has a well-argued case for valuing many different approaches to international relations:

But because academic disciplines are largely self-defining and self-policing (i.e., we determine the “criteria of merit” and success depends almost entirely on one’s reputation among fellow academics), there is the ever-present danger that academic disciplines spin off into solipsistic and self-regarding theorizing that is divorced from the real world (and therefore unlikely to be refuted by events) and of little value to our students, to policymakers, or even interested citizens. This tendency occurs primarily because proponents of one approach naturally tend to think that their way of doing business is superior, and some of them work overtime to promote people who look like them and to exclude people whose work is different. Anybody who has spent a few years in a contemporary political science department cannot fail to have observed this phenomenon at work; there just aren’t very many people who are genuinely catholic in their tastes and willing to embrace work that isn’t pretty much like their own.

I read Walt’s comment after re-reading Michael Desch‘s discussion of Waltzian structural neo-realism, constructivism, and strategic culture (PDF), which is shaped by how different proponents have approached their research programs.

31st May 2011: Dropped

For the past several years, in a developmental editing role, I have worked with academics on their grant applications and publication track records. The Australian Research Council’s Excellence for Research in Australia (ERA) initiative has been one external driver of this work. Minister Kim Carr’s announcement on 30th May that he is ending ERA’s journal ranking system has renewed debate, from incisive critics like Anna Poletti and Josh Gans.

The ARC originally conceived ERA’s 2010 journal rankings to bring evidence-based metrics and greater transparency to the higher education sector. Its Excel spreadsheet of 19,000 ranked journals was a controversial but useful tool to discuss with academics their ‘target’ journals and in-progress work. The team that built the Excel spreadsheet benchmarked the project against similar exercises in the United Kingdom, Europe and New Zealand. Whilst there was confusion about the final rankings of some journals, ERA 2010 was a move in the direction of Google’s analytics and ‘chaordic’ projects.

Minister Carr gave the following reason for ending the journal rankings:

“There is clear and consistent evidence that the rankings were being deployed inappropriately within some quarters of the sector, in ways that could produce harmful outcomes, and based on a poor understanding of the actual role of the rankings.

“One common example was the setting of targets for publication in A and A* journals by institutional research managers.”

Consider a more well-known ranking alternative to ERA: Hollywood’s Academy Awards. Studios invest hundreds of thousands of dollars in lavish marketing campaigns for their films. The nominees gain visibility and negotiation bargaining power in the film industry and for ancillary marketing deals. The winners gain substantive, long-term career and financial benefits, and not just a guest appearance on the television series Entourage. Success goes to the resilient. A similar dynamic to ERA 2010 plays out in the quarterly rankings of mutual fund managers, and in subcultures like the 1978-84 post-punk or ‘new wave’ music movement which ushered in MTV’s dominance.

ERA’s developers appear to have made three mistakes. First, there were inconsistencies between the draft and final rankings which remain unexplained, and that galvanised public criticism from academics. Second, its developers may not have considered the ‘unintended’ yet ‘real-world’ decisions that institutional research managers would make using ERA data: poaching high-performance researchers from competitors, closing low-ranked journals, reengineering departments, and evaluating the research components of promotions applications. If this sounds scary, you probably haven’t worked on post-merger integration or consortia bids. Third, the choice of letter codes – A*, A, B, C and unranked – rather than a different descriptive measure, introduced subtle anchoring, framing and representativeness biases into the ERA 2010 journal rankings.

Academics often knew what ERA sought to explicitly codify yet this tacit knowledge could be fragile. For instance, Richard Slaughter spent significant time during a Swinburne Masters in strategic foresight distinguishing between the field’s flagship journal (Elsevier’s Futures), the savvy new entrant (Emerald’s Foresight), and the critical vanguard (Tamkang University’s Journal of Futures Studies). Each journal had its own history, editorial preferences, preferred methodologies, and delimits. You ‘targeted’ each journal accordingly, and sometimes several at once if an article was controversial. ERA’s draft rankings reflected this disciplinary understanding but the 2010 final rankings did not. Likewise, to get into the A*-ranked International Security journal or to get a stellar publisher for international politics – Cambridge, Princeton, Yale, MIT – can take several years of drafting, re-drafting, editing, seminars and consulting with colleagues and professional networks. An influential book from one of these imprints can take up to five to seven years, from ideation to first journal reviews. The “quality is free” in the final manuscript.

This presented a challenge to institutional research managers and to university workload models. This developmental time can inform teaching, seminars, conference panels with exemplars, and peer networking. But it doesn’t necessarily show up quickly as a line-item that can be monitored by managers or evaluated by promotions committees. Instead, it can look like ‘dead time’ or high-reward gambits which have not paid off. Thus, the delays can be potentially detrimental and could affect institutional perceptions on academic performance. Institutional research managers also may not have the scope to develop the above tacit knowledge outside their disciplinary training and professional expertise.

So, like Hollywood producers, the institutional research managers possibly resorted to the A* and A journal codes as visible, high-impact, high-reward rankings. It was a valuable, time-saving short-cut through complex, messy territory. An academic with 15 A* and A level publications looked more convincing on paper than academic with 30 B and C level papers over the same period. A research team with A* and A level publications would be well positioned for ARC Discovery and Linkage grants. Australian Government funds from the annual research data collection had halo effects and financial benefits to institutions, like the Academy Award nominees have for film studios. It can be easier to buy-in expertise like professors and ambitious young researchers than to try and develop would-be writers. Rather than a “poor understanding”, I suggest the institutional research managers had different, perhaps less altruistic goals.

This was clearly a different role to what Carr and the ERA developers had intended, and conveyed to me at a university roadshow meeting. It was a spirited and valuable discussion: I pointed out to the ARC that a focus largely on A* and A level articles meant that 80% of research outputs were de-prioritised, including many B-ranked sub-field journals. However, there were alternatives to scrapping the system outright (or shifting to Field of Research codes and strengthened peer review): Carr might have made the inclusion and selection criterion for journals more public; could have addressed open publishing, and new and online journals; changed the ranking system from letter codes to another structure; and accepted some of the “harmful outcomes” as Machiavellian, power-based realpolitik which occurs in universities: what the sociologist Diane Vaughan calls “institutional deviance”. This may still happen whatever solution Carr and the ERA developers end up devising.

Perhaps if Carr had read two management books he would have foreseen the game that institutional research managers played with the ERA 2010 journal rankings. Jim Collins’ Good To Great (HarperCollins, New York, 2001) counselled managers to “get the right people on the bus”: A* and A level publishing academic stars. Michael Lewis’ Moneyball (W.W. Norton & Co, New York, 2003) examined how Oakland A’s general manager Billy Beane used sabermetrics – performance-based sports statistics – to build a competitive team, improve his negotiation stance with other teams, and maximise his training budget. Beane had to methodologically innovate: he didn’t have the multi-million dollar budgets of other teams. Likewise, institutional research managers appear to have used ERA 2010 like sabermetrics in order to devise optimal outcomes based on university research performance and other criteria. In their eyes, not all academics have an equal performance or scholarly contribution, although each can have a creative potential.

To me, the ERA 2010 journal rankings are still useful, depending on the appropriate context. They can inform discussions about ‘target’ journals and the most effective avenues for publications. They can be eye-opening in providing a filter to evaluate the quantity versus high-impact quality trade-offs in some publication track records. They have introduced me to journals in other disciplines that I wasn’t aware of, thus broadening the ‘journal universe’ being considered. They can be a well-delivered Platonic shock to an academic to expand their horizons and time-frames. The debate unleashed by Carr’s decision will be a distraction for some who will, instead, focus on the daily goals and flywheel tasks which best leverage their expertise and build their plausible, preferred, and personal futures.

3rd May 2011: Al Qaeda’s Strategic Culture

1. Initial Explanations

Al Qaeda-related literature focuses on several explanations for the terrorist organisation’s survival, growth and influence. A subset focuses on Osama Bin Laden as a charismatic leader and the Bin Laden family (Bergen 2006; Coll 2007). AQ evolved from Bin Laden’s financing of Abdullah Azzam’s Maktab al-Khidamat during the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghanistan war and involvement in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan and Afghanistan (Scheuer 2002; Coll 2004; Wright 2004; Bergen 2011). Other explanations advance theories about AQ’s entrepreneurship (Reeves 1999); its perceived similarity to earlier terrorist groups (Gunaratna 2001); the possibility of broader movements in the Middle East (Burke 2003); the Hamburg cell responsible for the September 11 attacks (McDermott 2006); the influence of regional intelligence agencies (Bodansky 2001) and an unsuccessful Balkans jihad (Kohlmann 2004). Scheuer (2002) made historical analogies with the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution whilst Johnson (2000) suggested September 11 was ‘blowback’ from the Afghanistan mujahideen.

2. Strategic Culture Explanations

Alastair Johnston’s ‘three generations’ (1995, 1998) provide one framework to examine if and how AQ has a strategic culture. The post-September 11 portrayal of AQ as an existential threat echoes ‘first generation’ work on US-Soviet rivalry in nuclear weapons proliferation (Gray 1979, 1984; Snyder 1977). The numerous Bin Laden biographies and those of Ayman Al-Zawahiri (Al-Zayyat 2004) and Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri (Lia 2008) highlight a tradition of political profiling of terrorist group leaders (Post 2005; Post 2008; Hudson 2001). These histories suggest pivot points such as Bin Laden’s feud with the House of Saud during the 1990-91 Gulf War about the presence of US military forces. Scheuer’s (2002) analogical study of AQ and Patrick Porter’s Reciprocity of War thesis (2007, 2009) are different responses to the concerns that Ken Booth (1979, 2007) raised in ‘second generation’ literature about ethnocentric profiling. Coll (2004), Wright (2004) and Bergen’s (2011) reportage maps the doctrinal, ideational and organisational factors that other ‘second generation’ analysts like Elizabeth Kier (1992), Bradley Klein (1994), and Michael Desch (1998) have raised in their scholarship. As yet there is no empirical, falsifiable theory for AQ as Johnston (1995, 1998) posits, although Long (2006) contends that ‘fourth generation’ analysts focus on AQ’s covert development of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Strategic culture insights can also be applied to Bin Laden’s communiqués and public statements (Bin Laden and Lawrence 2005; Kepel and Milelli 2010), and to his interviews with journalists (Fisk 1996; Miller 1997; Arnett 1997; Fisk 1997; Ummat 2001).

3. Other Explanations

The ‘self-images’ of Al Qaeda appear to have evolved in proximity to the September 11 attacks and to the role of idea entrepreneurs (Mueller 2009; Mueller 2010). They may also reflect the potential biases of analysts from different intelligence agencies (Tversky and Kahneman 1979; Scheuer 2002; Treverton 2009; Jervis 2010) evaluating AQ as a complex, ambiguous problem. Snyder (1977) also noted this about Soviet elites’ possible use of nuclear weapons during the late Cold War.

2nd May 2011: Osama Bin Laden Dead

Obama Announces UBL's Death (Doug Mills/New York Times)

Al Qaeda’s leader Osama bin Laden was killed Sunday during an attack on Abottabad, Pakistan (NY Times story).

Prior to the White House’s official confirmation, the story leaked onto Twitter (NY Times story).

Bin Laden’s death changes a case study chapter I was beginning to outline about Al Qaeda.

Some resources:

Transcript of Obama’s comments on Osama bin Laden’s death.

New York Times obituary of Osama bin Laden.

• George Packer: Better Late Than Never.

• David Remnick: Obama and Osama.

• Lawrence Wright: Hey, Hey, Goodbye.

• Google Maps display of Bin Laden’s compound.

• PBS Frontline episode Hunting Bin Laden.

• Bin Laden biographers: Peter Bergen, Michael Scheuer, and Lawrence Wright.

• Steve Coll on Young Osama (New Yorker).

• Lawrence Wright on Rebellion Within Al Qaeda (New Yorker).

5th April 2011: PhD Research Questions

1. How can theories originally developed for nation-states and national security institutions be applied to non-state actors?

Snyder (1977) originally conceptualised strategic culture for the comparative analysis of decision-makers and policymakers in different nation-states. Booth (1979), Gray (1984), Kier (1992) and Johnston (1998) have each applied Snyder’s insights to nation-states, and the doctrine development process of national security institutions.

Recently, analysts and scholars have begun to apply strategic culture as a framework to non-state actors such as terrorist organisations. This is a ‘levels of analysis’ issue. Cronin (2003) and Rasmussen (2003) note globalisation and reactive changes to US politico-military policy as enabling factors. Long (2006) suggest that Al Qaeda had developed a strategic culture because of its covert attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction. Porter’s Reciprocity of War thesis (2007 and 2009) challenged earlier models in arguing that non-state actors could use combat experiences to improvise and adapt to new conditions.

This study suggests that theories originally developed for nation-states might be applicable to terrorist organisations under the following conditions:

1. Nation-State Emulation: Berman (2009) note that Hamas and Hezbollah have each developed quasi-state infrastructures to support members, including civil society services. Coll (2004) and Wright (2007) observe that Al Qaeda made infrastructure investments in Sudan and Afghanistan to support the governments of ‘failed’ nation-states. FARC established an autonomous zone in Colombia. These examples suggest that strategic culture frameworks originally developed for nation-states can be applied to terrorist organisations who emulate aspects of nation-states. A variant on direct emulation of nation-state functions may be the ‘institutional capture’ of a group or its main adherents as part of a political party process.

2. ‘Borrowed’ Cultures: ‘Lone wolf’ terrorists may ‘borrow’ parts of their ideology from nation-states and other actors. Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh (Hewitt 1995) was shaped by Gulf War combat experience, rejection from Green Berets training, the Michigan Militia movement, and ‘new world order’ conspiracy theories on shortwave radio stations. Chase (2003) and Dammbeck (2003) suggest that Ted Kaczynski’s experiences with Cold War psychological experiments at Harvard University shaped the Unabomber’s hatred of technology. Lifton (2000) notes that Aum Shinrikyo developed a syncretic worldview which reflected Japan’s fears of resurgent militarism, biological warfare experimentation, and new spirituality. These examples suggest that aspects of a strategic culture may be ‘borrowed’ from other sources and refashioned by terrorist organisations.

The result may not be a functioning strategic culture as Snyder (1997) or Johnston (1998) envisioned, but rather a hybrid. Importantly, ‘borrowed’ cultures situate terrorist organisations within a range of other influences and may explain aspects of their subjective worldviews which some analysts and scholars have previously dismissed. The same process can occur in civilian art movements which adopt aesthetics and symbolism for antinomian shock value (Ford 2000).

3. Organisational Strategy: Strategic culture frameworks may be applied to terrorist organisations which meet the following criteria: (i) Longitudinal survival of a group, organisation or campaign, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Ireland and Spain, respectively. (ii)  Conceptualisation of a grand strategy in available doctrines and propaganda, such as the Vietnam War oppositional tactics of the Weather Underground (Green and Siegel 2002; Varon 2004); and Al Qaeda’s propaganda messages (Bin Laden, Lawrence and Howarth 2005; Kepel and Milleli 2008). This differs from yet may anticipate and respond to the nation-state’s formulation of grand strategy to defeat terrorism (Cronin and Ludes 2004; Cronin 2009; Hill 2010). (iii) Pursuit of a strategic agenda that requires significant resources, such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons acquisition. This is the criterion that Long (2006) uses to suggest that Al Qaeda has a strategic culture. Lifton (2000) also applies it to Aum Shinrikyo, which Hudson (1999) notes attempted to develop its own nascent government structure.

These three criteria sets can inform the selection of specific terrorist organisations for case studies and data coding, and theory-testing procedures using strategic culture frameworks. Furthermore, it may provide new perspectives on the organisational level of analysis conducted by Martha Crenshaw, David Rapoport, and others in counter-terrorism studies. It promises to advance the analysis of terrorist organisations beyond typology-based frameworks (Rosenthal 2006).

2. Why have scholars used strategic culture differently, and are these views reconcilable?

Johnston (1998 and 1995) conceived an influential ‘generational’ framework to explain the conceptual evolution of strategic culture theories. These are: (i) early 1980s security specialists and Sovietologists; (ii) Gramscian security specialists and institutional studies; and (iii) empirical, falsifiable theorists and constructivists. Howlett (2006) posits an emerging, fourth generation that develops policy-relevant theories in nuclear proliferation.

However, Johnston’s framework has faced criticism. Katzenstein (1995) and Lantis (2002) adopted constructivist and national security policy stances, respectively. Gray (1999) contended that all strategists are ‘encultured’: they are influenced by cultural patterns of assumptions which may be independent of immediate, situational constraints. Poore (2002) felt the context of the Gray-Johnston exchange was missing, whilst Lock (2010) looked to earlier, overlooked theorists for guidance. Johnston’s ‘generational’ framework has unresolved issues, such as his selection and coding of theorists. For instance, Kier (1992) rejected involvement in the subsequent Gray-Johnston debate because her ‘program of research’ focussed on institutional analysis of doctrinal development. There also may be alternative ways to examine theorists rather than Johnston’s ‘generational’ approach.

For strategic culture to become a robust, analytical framework, several issues must be clarified. The variation in scope, level of and units of analysis, stance, and object of analysis must be mapped — the existing literature does so in an ‘ad hoc’ manner. Issues of scholarly use, differences, and reconcilable views need also to be clarified. This study seeks to provide this clarity, and to test the parsimony of strategic culture frameworks within a counter-terrorism studies context.