RAND has a new research paper out on Islamic State’s economics:
At its peak, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) controlled vast portions of territory in Iraq and Syria with several million inhabitants. ISIL’s territorial ambition and desire to conduct state-like governance over this territory are integral to its global ideological appeal. By examining ISIL’s impact on local economic activity in Iraq and Syria, this report seeks to assess the effectiveness of ISIL’s governance over its self-styled caliphate.
This report leverages remote sensing data and commercial satellite imagery to offer a unique, data-driven look inside areas controlled by the Islamic State. It paints a bleak picture of economic life under ISIL, replete with shortages of electricity, massive refugee flows, reductions in agricultural output, and upticks in violence all associated with ISIL control.
At times, ISIL was able to build a dense governing apparatus that helped maintain stable local commercial activity, particularly in its strategic capitals in Raqqah and Mosul. At other times, ISIL mismanaged key resources or sought to punish its citizenry rather than govern it. However, this report suggests that decaying economic conditions in ISIL-held territory are also a product of ISIL’s inability to insulate its territory from opposing military forces. Outside pressure against ISIL successfully prevented the group from realizing its governing ambitions across significant parts of its caliphate, with major consequences for its ability to support functioning local economies.
This report is important for those trying to understand the group’s impact on local populations in Iraq and Syria, for those seeking to counter its financing or conduct post-conflict stabilization, and for broader efforts to understand the economic impact of insurgent governance.
I’ll likely be citing it in my in-progress PhD chapter on Islamic State.
Salman Ahmed and Alexander Bick from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have authored a discussion paper on the Trump administration’s likely national security strategy. The authors contend Trump has signalled a “mercantile, transactional vision” that may threaten the existing alliance structure.
One of the major insights I gained from my Bachelor of Arts (Cinema Studies major) at La Trobe University was how the post-classical Hollywood studio system evolved. The late 1960s to the mid 1970s was a period of innovation: the rise of powerful auteur directors and producers. From the mid 1970s onwards the blockbuster film, changes in film financing, and merger-driven studio consolidation came to dominate. J.D. Connor’s book The Studios After The Studios (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2015) may be the definitive recent study of this period (which he dubs ‘neoclassical Hollywood’). Its legacies shape current scholarship on the political economy of the creative industries – and Entourage fans.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute is running a Nuclear Strategy Masterclass on 27th September 2017 in Canberra. The speakers include the Hon. Kim Beazley, Senator David Fawcett, ASPI’s Rod Lyon, Griffith’s Andrew O’Neil (invited), and the Lowy Institute’s John Carlson. Brad Roberts of the Center for Global Security Research and author of The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford University Press, 2015) is a major speaker.
My in-progress PhD uses process tracing as one of its main research methodologies. Publisher Palgrave Macmillan has two major regional studies out this year — Fatemeh Shayan’s Security in the Persian Gulf Region, and Yandry Kurniawan’s The Politics of Securitization in Democratic Indonesia — which use process tracing. Good to see the methodology being used more.
I’ve followed S.M. Amadae‘s work for several years. Her 2016 book Prisoners of Reason informs Chapter 1 of my PhD on theory-building in strategic culture. Now, I’m reading her 1999 PhD dissertation from the University of California Berkeley on the 1944-85 history of rational choice theory. I know that rational choice frameworks have influenced Jack Snyder’s later work and Martha Crenshaw’s analysis of terrorist organisations. I also note that Amadae thanks Philip Mirowski in her acknowledgments. Amadae and Mirowski’s work are writing models for possible future research. For example, it may be possible to write a similar history of strategic culture research that goes beyond Alastair Iain Johnston’s influential generations framework.
Author and scholar Aaron Cheak is on the latest Daimonosophy 2.0 podcast where he briefly talks about Metis as “cunning awareness” and as a kind of fluid engagement with the world that reshapes the psyche. He mentions Peter Kingsley’s book Reality (The Golden Sufi Center, 2004) on Metis. Cheak and I discussed Metis and Kingsley’s book in 2005-06, in the context of my 1998 Book of Oblique Strategies ‘received text’ experience.
Paul A. Bilokon and Jan Novotny have a new book out on 16th April 2018 called KDB+ For Electronic Trading: Q, High Frequency Financial Data and Electronic Trading (Wiley). No details yet but this book will likely be practitioner oriented. You can order here.
In 2005-06 whilst at Monash University, I considered early warning indicators to prevent genocide. One of the limits was the lack of a multinational rapid response capability. Now, Yf Reykers and John Karlsrud have a new overview article in Contemporary Security Review, introducing some recent scholarly research. Here’s the abstract:
Military rapid response mechanisms are generally understood as troops that are on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame. Yet, the overall track record of the existing multinational rapid response mechanisms within the European Union, the African Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains disappointing, and the United Nations does not even have a rapidly deployable capacity anymore. Meanwhile, despite that calls for the further development of these mechanisms are still being voiced politically, scholarly literature remains fragmented. This is problematic as many of the obstacles faced by these organizations are similar. This forum uniquely compares experiences from the four aforementioned organizations. Drawing on these insights, this introductory article identifies some key factors that hamper or enable the development and deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms.