PhD Confirmation of Candidature Proposal
Alex Burns, 29th January 2013

Title of Thesis/Research Report
The Development of Strategic Culture in Terrorist Organisations

Statement of the Research Problem

Project Overview

Terrorist organisations re-emerged in the post-Cold War interregnum as trans-national, non-state actors studied by anthropologists, sociologists, political economists and political scientists. Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks upon the United States of America on 11th September 2001 led to the rapid expansion of research programs aimed to provide scholarly insights for politico-military decision-making. Initially, these research programs focused on estimative threat assessment of Al Qaeda; probed terrorist financing; and considered terrorist organisations as a threat to the international system of nation-states (Cronin 2003; Brenner 2006). Contemporary research on terrorist organisations makes parallels with social entrepreneurship (Abdukadirov 2010); leadership dynamics (Herman & Sakiev 2011); moral hazard (Shapiro & Siegel 2012); and estimative threat assessment of risk factors (Cook & Lounsbery 2011).

This analytical, theory-building ‘pilot’ project examines terrorist organisations from a different perspective. Strategic culture is an analytical construct or framework to examine the long-term, culturally transmitted factors that influence politico-military elites, security communities, and decision-makers to use force. Terrorist organisations use political and religious violence to advance their strategic goals and to influence other strategic actors, such as communities of support, national governments, and politico-military elites. Strategic culture thus both isolates a set of analytical, causal, and explanatory variables that might contribute to understanding the internal, decision-making process that leads to terrorist attacks; and that might provide different explanatory models and theories about how terrorist organisations work. These insights might inform estimative intelligence assessments (Jervis 2010); the ‘at a distance’ psychological profiling of terrorist leadership (Post 2005; Post 2008); and understanding the patterns of terrorist innovation and diffusion (Dolnik 2007; Horowitz 2010).

This project uses a mixed methods approach and three-phase process—discovery, coding, and analysis—to explore how terrorist organisations might develop a strategic culture, including under what specific conditions this process might fail. This project is the ‘pilot’ study in what will be a long-term research program; although the potential case universe of terrorist organisations that fits the selection criteria for a potential strategic culture is small an in-depth analysis is beyond the ‘pilot’ project scope. A structured case study comparison of three terrorist organisations—Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejercito del Puebelo (hereafter FARC-EP)—will be undertaken to examine the strategic culture criterion. A codebook and codelist will be developed using a range of qualitative coding techniques that will provide a resource for the long-term research program.
This project makes several original contributions to the respective scholarly literature on strategic culture and terrorist organisations. First, the project re-examines the history, sources, and theory-building of strategic culture. In doing so, it challenges and offers alternatives to the influential theory-building frameworks which most scholars accept. Second, the project is the first in-depth and systematic analysis of strategic culture in terrorist organisations. It strengthens the sub-field coherence and links between counterterrorism studies, intelligence studies, and political psychology. Third, the project’s mixed methods approach advances a research agenda that addresses potential analytic and cognitive biases that can affect the ‘at a distance’ examination of terrorist organisations and leadership decision-making about the use of force. Finally, the project’s emphasis on strategic culture will provide a different explanatory perspective on Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and FARC-EP than the existing scholarship on terrorist organisations.

A new understanding will emerge of how strategic culture theory-building can contribute to analysing and understanding terrorist organisations, their leadership, and the internal decision-making that leads to terrorist attacks.

Major Research Questions

The ‘pilot’ project has the following major research questions:

1. What are the descriptive, causal, and evaluative criteria for establishing that a strategic culture construct is valid? What are the judgment criteria?

2. Why have scholars in different political science sub-fields used strategic culture differently? Are these different views reconcilable? How can we increase their decision utility for intelligence analysts and national security policymakers?

3. What mechanisms have the existing literature on organisational dynamics, and terrorist organisations in particular, identified that are relevant to a strategic culture?

4. How do the chosen mixed methods advance the methodological integration of strategic culture frameworks and the ‘at a distance’ study of terrorist organisations?

5. What do the comparative case studies on Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo and FARC reveal about the possibility, variance, and failure conditions of strategic culture in terrorist organisations?

6. How can the project’s research findings inform national security policymaking, in particular: (a) estimative intelligence assessments; (b) the ‘at a distance’ psychological profiling of terrorist group leadership; and (c) understanding the patterns of terrorist innovation and diffusion?

These research questions address important problems and barriers to identifying under what conditions and circumstances a terrorist organisation may have a strategic culture. Strategic culture has not yet been examined in terrorist organisations in an in-depth and systematic manner. One reason is that strategic culture is used as an inconsistent construct—due to multiple definitions, epistemological stances, and contexts of use—that must be clarified. The potential case universe of terrorist organisations has also not been examined using rigorous selection criteria. This project addresses these concerns below, to advance strategic culture as
a potential research program to examine terrorist organisations, including the specific conditions under which a terrorist organisation may fail despite attempts to develop a strategic culture.

**Strategic Culture**

Strategic culture is a set of ideational constructs, derived from cognitive filters, experience and learning that enables national security elites to choose, evaluate and to prioritise decisions about the strategic use of force. It emerged in 1977 in a strategic studies context which anticipated the SALT II nuclear arms treaty talks. Jack Snyder, Ken Booth, and Colin S. Gray each made important, independent contributions to the scope and conceptualisation of early research on strategic culture. Their work built on an earlier generation of ‘national culture’ studies including the United States-based Office of Strategic Services’ attempts during World War II to understand the Nazi senior leadership (Pick 2012).

Jack Snyder originally defined strategic culture as:

> “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have achieved through instruction and imitation with each other with regard to nuclear strategy” (Snyder 1977: 8).

Alastair Iain Johnston defined strategic culture as:

> “An integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs” (Johnston 1995a: 36).

Strategic culture concerns the decision-making of military and political elites and regimes. This has matured from Snyder’s (1977) analysis of Soviet nuclear strategy, and Lord’s evaluation of American strategic culture (1985), to Donnelly’s (2006) analysis looming geopolitical conflicts with Iran and China as regional ‘rising powers’. Strategic culture is thus an analytical framework that can be used in foreign policy statecraft (Deibel 2007), national security planning (Lantis 2002), and in the ‘at a distance’ profiling of political and terrorist leaders (Post 1990; Post 2005; Post 2008; Lifton 1999), and intelligence post-mortems (Jervis 2010). Historians have used frameworks very similar to strategic culture to evaluate politico-military decision-making involving Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the 2003 Iraq War (Dower 2010).

Strategic culture frameworks have evolved due to several different research programs from individual researchers. The frameworks have common elements: (1) cultural transmission over a diachronic, longitudinal period of time (Distin 2011; Schonpflug 2009); (2) culture as shared meaning and symbols of significance (Johnston 1995a; Johnston 1995b); (3) imitation and learning (Snyder 1977; Porter 2009); (4) institutions or organisational forms that can engage in strategy formulation and execution (Wright 2006; Bergen 2011; Lifton 1999) including politico-military dimensions; and (5) decision-making on the use of force (Snyder 1977; Post 2005). Collectively, these five elements underpin strategic culture theories, although different generations and theorists emphasise certain facets.
Strategic culture can evolve in several different ways: (1) regimes which challenge or change the international order, such as through revolution or nuclear weapons acquisition (Donnelly 2006; Brenner 2006; Cronin 2003); (2) changes in military power projection such as through the diffusion of military innovations or ‘national ways of war’ (Horowitz 2010); (3) non-state actors who may gain greater significance in the international system (Cronin 2003; Cronin 2009); (4) reassessments of domestic politics by policymaker elites (Lantis 2002; Post 2005); and (5) emergent, complex threats which create new security dilemmas and challenges for intelligence analysts (Jervis 2010).

This ‘pilot’ project makes several original contributions to the strategic culture literature. It re-examines the framework’s major thinkers, from historical precursors to the important contributions of Jack Snyder (1977), Ken Booth (2007), Colin S. Gray (1999; 2007), Alastair Iain Johnston (1995a; 199b), Patrick Porter (2009), and the so-called fourth generation of theorists (Lantis 2002; Glenn, Howlett & Poore 2004; Glenn 2009) who often contrasted their research with neorealist international relations (Little 2007). The project re-examines sources of strategic culture, the constructivist versus neorealist debate, theory-building and theory-testing cycles, the case universe, and complementary research programs.

To-date strategic culture studies have largely focused on descriptive case studies of the politico-military strategic cultures that nation-states and regions have had (Snyder 1977) or comparative analysis using different theoretical frameworks (Lantis 2002; Haglund 2004). Second generation theorists like Bradley S. Klein emphasised interpretivist approaches based on hermeneutic analysis of declarative/symbolic statements versus operational actions, such as in alliance structures and security communities (Lock 2010). The third generation advanced mainly a Popperian positivist explanatory framework and sought greater conclusion validity for the inferences made from historical research and operational actions. Much of Johnston's (1995a; 1995b) contribution was to advance a greater understanding of construct validity and theory-testing protocols that subsequent researchers could use. To achieve this, Johnston and other third generation theorists like Jeffrey Legro and Elizabeth Kier developed more rigorous coding and descriptive mechanisms to explain what strategic culture was and to differentiate its effects from other causal variables and explanations. Fourth generation theorists (Lantis 2002; Cronin 2003; Donnelly 2006; Cronin 2009; Lock 2010) have predominantly focused on strategic culture as an explanatory framework to deal with complex, ‘over the horizon’ threats to national security. This ‘pilot’ project builds on the methodological and research design innovations of the third generation, and the policymaking insights of the emerging fourth generation of scholars. It also attempts to offer an alternative view of theory-building cycles to Johnston’s generational framework (Johnston 1995a; Johnston 1995b) which currently dominates scholarship on strategic culture frameworks.

**Terrorist Organisations**

The academic study of terrorist organisations emerged after the 1972 Munich Olympics and the development of Counterterrorism Studies as an applied subfield of political science (Stampnitzky 2008). The early distinction between terrorist psychology and strategic logics can be reframed as different levels of causal analysis that a strategic culture framework would encompass (Crenshaw 1990; Post 1990; Hudson 2001; Stern 2003; Post 2005; Post 2008; Crenshaw 2010). David Rapoport (1988) surveyed terrorist organisations during the late Cold War as part of developing his influential Waves model of terrorism. Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) framed the post-Cold War interregnum as the rise of ‘cosmological’ or religiously
motivated terrorism. This coincided with apocalyptic, millennialist visions of ‘new terrorism’ (Laqueur 2000; Lifton 1999) which the September 11 terrorist attacks were ‘curve fitted’ to. The contemporary study of terrorist organisations draws on insights from organisational dynamics (Daft 2013) and related fields including organisational micro-economics (Krueger 2008), and the cultural study of international relations (Lebow 2008) and international security (Booth 2007). It is thus differentiated from the broader literature on post-September 11 risk management, and business continuity, disaster and emergency planning. Post-September 11 terrorist organisations are likened to social entrepreneurship (Abdukadirov 2010); to ‘rising powers’ that challenge the international system (Donnelly 2006); to moral hazards (Shapiro & Siegel 2012); and to security threats that must be actively risk managed (Cook & Lounsberry 2011). However, terrorist organisations are also a special case that challenges the ‘received’ models and frameworks in the organisational dynamics literature. This is notably for analysis of strategic goals and intent (Crenshaw 1990); a terrorist organisation’s population ecology (Dolnik 2007; Horowitz 2010); its internal culture, decision-making and change preferences (Stern 2003); and its leadership structure (Post 2005; Post 2008; Hoffman 2006). Thus, recent counterterrorism literature has identified some important anomalies and differences to the organisational dynamics approach that new theory-building frameworks could develop.

This ‘pilot’ project combines strategic culture frameworks with the analytical, comparative study of terrorist organisations. It thus differs from the post-September 11 school of critical counterterrorism studies (Zulaika 2009), which often locates terrorism as the causal manifestation of failed counterterrorism, national security, and politico-military policies. Instead, primary and selected secondary sources are examined to understand how terrorists view themselves, and the strategic subcultures within terrorist organisations (Snyder 1977). Sources for this approach can include anthropological fieldwork (Atran 2011; Vollmann 2004; Murakami 2003; Gibson 1994); investigative journalism and reportage (Filkins 2008; Wright 2006); historical event analysis (Dower 2010); historical group analysis (Orisini 2011; Varon 2004); and analysis of communiques, propaganda, and strategic communication (Ibrahim 2007; Kepel & Milelli 2010; Lawrence 2005; Lia 2009; Scheuer 2011). This approach acknowledges institutional filters about terrorist organisations (Herman & O’Sullivan 1989; Kuklick 2006) primarily through awareness of cognitive biases and decision heuristics (Kahneman 2011; Kahneman & Tversky 1979).

Review of Relevant Research and Theory

The following sections highlight some of the relevant research and theory on strategic culture and terrorist organisations which further informs and scopes this ‘pilot’ project. Relevant material on how theory informs the project’s research design and methods are discussed below in the Procedure sections on Theoretical/Conceptual Frameworks, and Analytical Techniques and Research Design.

Strategic Culture In Terrorist Organisations

This ‘pilot’ project examines the possibility of strategic culture existing in terrorist organisations rather than politico-military elites, nation-states, or trans-national alliance structures. Two trends suggested a link between strategic culture and terrorist organisations. Post-September 11 threat assessments of Al Qaeda focused on globalisation and the challenge to the international system (Cronin 2003; Brenner 2009). Subsequent counterterrorism research examined various strategies to disrupt and to end terrorist organisations (Cronin
Counterterrorism scholarship often suggests insights about strategic culture and terrorist organisations but these currently remain undeveloped in terms of theory-building. Hamas and Hezbollah illustrate economic decisions rather than cultural transmission to use social services in building quasi-state communities of support (Krueger 2008). Recent profiles of Al Qaeda strategic thinkers highlight a new complexity of strategic goals, purpose, and intent (Lia 2009; Scheuer 2011). The religious structure of some terrorist organisations (Murakami 2003; Lifton 1999) may provide a way to cross-compare the ‘cosmological’ terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2003) with theoretical frameworks that contend religion is one cultural transmission model for strategic culture (Johnston 1995a). The integration of strategic culture frameworks and terrorist organisation analysis will advance this research agenda.

Mid-Range Variables and Meso-Level Analysis

Strategic culture is described as a mid-range variable; a theoretical framework; and sometimes a Lakatosian rival research program to neorealism in international relations (Glenn, Howlett & Poore 2004; Elman, Elman & Waltz 2003; Desch 1998). To-date, strategic culture theorists have rejected ‘meta-theories’ that simplify long-term, diachronic change (Johnston 1995a; Johnston 1995b; Haglund 2004; Porter 2009; Dower 2010). Instead, strategic culture explanations are often more mid-range or meso-level (Haglund 2004) and fit between macro trend like globalisation (Cronin 2003) and the micro-dynamics of terrorist individuals and small, clandestine terrorist organisations (Stern 2003; Varon 2004). The potential case universe of terrorist organisations that might have a strategic culture would exist more at the meso-level of analysis. Organisational dynamics phenomena like complex strategic intent, purpose and goals; significant organisational growth; a rich culture of myths, symbols, values and worldviews; and the existence of a decision elite or leadership might signify that a terrorist organisation has evolved beyond the small, clandestine model of micro-dynamics into a meso-level entity that strategic culture would examine (Daft 2013; Johnston 1995a; Post 2008; Post 2005).

Snyder’s (1977) distinction between a strategic culture and multiple strategic subcultures in a politico-military elite remains often overlooked in subsequent literature. This distinction provides one way to link strategic culture frameworks with terrorist organisational structures and strategic thinking (Crenshaw 1990). Johnston (1995a: 32) also distinguishes strategic culture from being a “residual variable” on the one hand, or “idiosyncratic preferences of individual decision makers” on the other. If Snyder offers a level of analysis distinction then Johnston claims that strategic culture must be culturally transmitted over a significant time-period. Post’s (2005) use of strategic culture in terrorist leadership profiling distinguished between different terrorist organisations and structures, but did not use the different strategic culture frameworks or theories in the existing literature. Collectively, this past work suggests that some terrorist organisations and strategic culture frameworks (including multiple strategic subcultures) might fit a similar unit and level of analysis.

Terrorist Organisation Frameworks and Models

Recent counterterrorism literature on terrorist organisations has developed new analytical frameworks and models. Government counterterrorism policy might target a ‘vintage model’ of a terrorist organisation that has changed due to different strategic intent, operational
complexity, and the growth in recruits due to successful, high-profile terrorist attacks (Faria & Arce, 2012). Rapid growth in a terrorist organisation can shape the magnitude and complexity of terrorist attacks undertaken, and the risk of decline (Miller 2012). Whilst factors including group size, ideology, tactics and home base country are important, terrorist organisations also benefit from a larger size, varied attack types, and a religious belief structure (Blomberg, Gaibulloev & Sandler 2011). Lifecycle models of ‘grassroots’ inter-group competition between national governments and terrorist organisations are also popular (Phillips 2011). Leadership primary sources on strategic intent and terrorist attack are now analysed for organisational insights (Herman & Sakiev 2011).

Collectively, this new research on terrorist organisations suggests potential insights that strategic culture frameworks might further explore. Terrorist innovation models (Dolnik 2007; Horowitz 2010) have already identified a population ecology involving intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and a potential range of terrorist organisations. The existence of a strategic culture or stable strategic subcultures within a terrorist organisation would enable it to grow in size; to recruit new members; and to culturally transmit its belief structures over time. Growing sophistication in intelligence and psychological assessment methods mean that the leadership of terrorist organisations can be understood more in-depth (Post 2005; Post 2010). Researchers can now use backwards induction to reason back from successful terrorist attacks and to make Bayesian estimative inferences (Jervis 2010) about terrorist organisation capabilities, resource-based strategies, culture, and leadership.

Using strategic culture frameworks to investigate terrorist organisations also differs from several influential approaches in the existing literature. Terrorist organisations are special cases that do not appear to directly fit many of the generic models in organisational dynamics derived from cybernetics, industrial economics or multi-national conglomerates (Daft 2013). Inductive research that examines how terrorist organisations view themselves—rather than what organisational dynamics models deductively predict about them—might yield new insights. Strategic culture also does not appear to proscribe the form that a terrorist organisation must take—beyond certain ‘necessary and sufficient’ parameters. Thus, this ‘pilot’ study also differs from influential network models of terrorist organisations (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001) and it augments the use of social network analysis with other methodologies (Sageman 2004).

**Theory-Building Issues**

The following theory-building issues are evidence of how strategic culture frameworks and terrorist organisational analysis can advance a new research program.

**Theory-Building Exemplars.** The early exponents who developed the initial theory-building cycles in strategic culture did not remain to develop more in-depth frameworks. Snyder (1977) wrote his influential paper on Soviet political elites and nuclear policy whilst as a pre-PhD analyst at the RAND think tank. Johnston gave strategic culture a coherent, positivist structure in a PhD project on Ming China (Johnston 1995a; Johnston 1995b) but abandoned the framework after the Gray-Johnston debate (Gray 1999). Snyder and Gray’s departure left Colin S. Gray to develop strategic history as an overarching meta-theoretical framework, and critics like Michael C. Desch (1998) who preferred neorealist approaches. Collectively, these factors meant that strategic culture has had a more episodic, scattered development as a sub-field. This has possibly impacted the coherence of the resulting theories. The literature on organisational dynamics is likewise shaped around frameworks from cybernetics, industrial
economics and similar areas (Daft 2013) that were not developed specifically to examine terrorist organisations. This ‘pilot’ project integrates relevant theory-building frameworks from the recent literature on terrorist organisations—which increasingly uses large-N studies, datasets, and quantitative research methods.

Methodological Limitations. Strategic culture literature reflects diverse epistemological stances: neorealism, constructivism, post-positivism, and interpretivism (Desch 1998; Glenn 2009; Glenn, Howlett & Poore 2004; Lantis 2002). The methodological implications of the initial definitions and frameworks are not always integrated (Snyder 1977; Johnston 1995a; Johnston 1995b; Gray 1999) or are used for rhetorical purposes in domestic policy debates (Porter 2009). Lakatosian and core literature approaches in neorealist theory suggest ways for strategic culture to develop methodological insights (Little 2007; Elman, Elman & Waltz 2003). Scholarly study of terrorist organisations often relies on selected secondary and occasional primary sources such as former member testimony (Lifton 1999; Murakami 2003) and propaganda communiques (Marlin 2002). This imposes limitations on the types of research methodologies that can be used and the generalisability of study findings.

The next section will outline the project’s research design and chosen methodologies.
The Procedure

Theoretical/Conceptual Frameworks

Theoretical Frameworks

Theory-Building: Development & Contrastive Analysis.

This ‘pilot’ project advances a pre-theory (Martel 2006) of strategic culture in terrorist organisations. Strategic culture focuses primarily on long-term, culturally transmitted factors, norms, and ideological belief systems (Distin 2011, Schonpfug 2009; Galtung & Inayatullah 1997) that affect the decision-making of senior leadership and decision elites (Snyder 1977). It isolates different causal, descriptive and explanatory mechanisms in terrorist organisations that are diachronic (through-time) than synchronic (present time) theories. For instance, theories of combat learning experience (Porter 2009) and terrorist innovation (Dolnik 2007; Horowitz 2010) may overlap with strategic culture yet are more synchronic in their time orientation. Popular decision-making frameworks in organisational dynamics such as analogical reasoning (Neustadt & May 1986; Kuklick 2006) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Kahneman 2011) examine different causal mechanisms. Instead, strategic culture has echoes in strategic history (Gray 1999); world security (Booth 2007); the ‘cultural turn’ in international relations theory (Lebow 2008), and long-term views of world political change (Owens IV 2010).

To-date the organisational dynamics literature has used existing explanatory theories to illuminate terrorist organisations (Daft 2013). This ‘pilot’ project instead uses inductive theory-building to develop a strategic culture approach and to contrast it with existing approaches. Researchers have adopted insights on the lifecycle, growth and survival of terrorist organisations (Faria & Arce 2012; Miller 2012; Phillips 2011; Blomberg, Gaibulloev & Sandler 2011) and estimative assessment of risks and threats (Cook & Lounsberry 2011). A major theme in first generation strategic culture and the early study of terrorist organisations is the study of senior leadership and decision elites (Post 1990; Post 2005; Post 2008) which now uses primary documentation (Blomberg, Gaibulloev & Sandler 2011; Scheuer 2011). Thus, this ‘pilot’ project uses adaptations of organisational dynamics from the counterterrorism and international security literature to augment a strategic culture approach.

Conceptual Framework

Chapter 1 of this ‘pilot’ project re-examines the historical theory-building cycles of strategic culture. A different approach to Alastair Iain Johnston’s (1995a; 1995b) three generations model is articulated that draws on recent theory-building (Haglund 2004; Glenn 2009; Glenn, Howlett & Poore 2004) and theory-testing (Lantis 2002) approaches. Secondly, the terrorist organisation literature suggests the possibility to further develop the ‘at a distance’ methodologies for psychological profiling of senior leadership and decision elites (Post 1990; Hudson 2001; Post 2005; Post 2008) using structured analytic techniques (Jervis 2010). Some specific techniques are discussed below in the section Analytical Techniques & Research Design. This ‘pilot’ project will advance a pre-theory (Martel 2006) and new conceptual framework that might be used to further develop a formal theory (Biddle 2004); an in-depth theoretical framework (Johnston 1995a; Booth 2007; Lebow 2008); and to develop specific tests for causal inference (Morgan & Winship 2007; Pearl 2009). These advances and new
conceptual framework will be developed beyond this ‘pilot’ project as a research program and a stream of research publications for ‘targeted’ academic journals.

**Research Hypotheses**

The project will examine the following hypotheses using mixed methods research and comparative case studies:

*Cultural Transmission Hypothesis*: Strategic culture involves the cultural transmission of long-term influences on decision-makers about the use of force and responses to it (Snyder 1977). Analogical reasoning (Neustadt & May 1986; Kuklick 2006), significant events (Dower 2010), and cultural transmission models (Distin 2011; Schonpflug 2009) offer three potential frameworks for understanding the causal, descriptive, and explanatory mechanisms involved. Early research and theory-building (Snyder 1977; Gray 1999; Booth 2007) focused on national cultures and long-term, diachronic (through-time) cultural transmission. This ‘pilot’ project advances these frameworks for the ‘at a distance’ study of terrorist organisations.

*Organisational Coherence Hypothesis*: If strategic culture exists in a terrorist organisation—perhaps as a series of strategic subcultures (Snyder 1977)—then it must have persisted over a certain time period. However, the initial theory-building literature is vague as is the organisational dynamics literature (Daft 2013). Cultural transmission models (Distin 2011; Schonpflug 2009) also suggest that ideological or religious models of strategic culture (Johnston 1995a; Johnston 1995b) might persist over splintered organisational forms. The literature on ‘at a distance’ psychological profiling of political and terrorist leaders (Post 1990; Post 2005; Post 2008; Lifton 1999) also suggests causal, descriptive and explanatory mechanisms that require further investigation at an organisational level. Finally, organisational coherence as a necessary and sufficient criterion for a strategic culture in a terrorist organisation is suggested by growth and lifecycle models (Faria & Arce, 2012; Miller 2012; Blomberg, Gaibulloev & Sandler 2011; Herman & Sakiev 2011; Phillips 2011).

*State Emulation Hypothesis*: This hypothesis focuses on non-state actors like terrorist organisations as the level of analysis and their aspirational, long-term strategic intent, purpose, and goals. A terrorist organisation may attempt to emulate aspects of the nation-state such as government structures, resource allocative capabilities (Bower & Gilbert 2005), and social programs (Cronin 2009; Cronin 2003; Brenner 2006; Lantis 2002) in a ‘grassroots’ inter-group competition with a nation-state’s government (Phillips 2011). Terrorist organisations might try to develop a ‘shadow government’ that would seize control of the nation-state’s government structures if terrorist attacks are successful (Lifton 1999; Hudson 2001; Murakami 2003) or in attempts to acquire nuclear weapons (Leitenberg & Zilinskas 2012). Alternatively, a terrorist organisation might mobilise its resource allocative capabilities (Bower & Gilbert 2005) in order to acquire military force projection or to control a geographic region as a safeguard (Leech 2011). Social programs can be used to build a community of support that will provide resilience (Wright 2006; Bergen 2011; Scheuer 2011). Finally, these aspirations may shape senior leaderships’ strategic communication to mid-level and low-level members (Herman & Sakiev 2011; Murakami 2003; Lifton 1999).
Analytical Techniques and Research Design

Analytical Techniques

Mixed Methods Approach. This ‘pilot’ project uses a mixed methods approach informed by earlier research designs (Biddle 2004) that used theory-building, formal modelling, and theory-testing using simulation. Insights from historical analysis, national security and grand strategy analysis, political psychology, propaganda analysis, intelligence analysis, and argumentation analysis are used to deal with the problems of examining terrorist organisations (Crenshaw 1990; Hudson 2001; Stern 2003; Cronin 2003; Brenner 2006; Cronin 2009) and ‘at a distance’ profiling of group leaders (Post 1990; Post 2005; Post 2008; Lifton 1999). Organisational dynamics insights are threaded throughout these chosen methodologies. This research also builds on existing and influential approaches to research design in political science and in the social sciences (King, Keohane & Verba 1994; Gerring 2012).

Proposed Methodologies.

Each methodology has a conceptual and theoretical background. Where relevant, their relationship is highlighted to the literature and frameworks on strategic culture and terrorist organisations.

National Security and Grand Strategy Frameworks: Increasingly, strategic culture literature deals with national security problems (Lantis 2002) and could be strengthened through grand strategy awareness (Deibel 2007). Strategic analysis can be applied to terrorist organisations to delineate their strategic intent and goals (Crenshaw 1990; Stern 2003; Cronin 2009; Crenshaw 2010); to the senior leadership or decision elites (Hudson 2001; Post 1990; Post 2005; Post 2008); and to national counterterrorism agencies. The victory or end goals that a terrorist organisation’s means or resources are directed to is often undefined in the past literature on terrorist organisations (Martel 2011). Clarification of these issues would strengthen the ‘pilot’ project’s examination of terrorist organisations.

Historical Analysis. The ‘pilot’ project draws on several traditions of historical analysis including military history (Murray & Sinnreich 2006) and international relations (Trachtenberg 2006) guidance on subject research, source analysis, and archives. However, archival research is not usually an option for investigating terrorist organisations, unless via journalistic reportage (Wright 2006; Bergen 2011; Leech 2011), interviews with former members (Lifton 1999; Murakami 2003), or historical reconstruction of past groups (Varon 2004; Orsini 2011). Historical analysis also informs the use of analogical reasoning (Neustadt & May 1986; Kuklick 2006) and the ‘afterlives’ of significant events (Dower 2010) to examine how decision-makers use and frame historical events and lessons for synchronic (present) use. In particular, Colin S. Gray (1999) has used analogical reasoning as part of his broader framework of strategic history. Historical analysis is also a reminder that a contemporary terrorist organisation might be now operationally or strategically different than the historical sources would suggest.

Intelligence Analysis and Propaganda Analysis: Intelligence analysis provides analytic, structured techniques to examine terrorist organisations as ‘black box’ entities from which deductive inferences are made using Bayesian methods (Jervis 2010) and cognitive biases in psychology (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Kahneman 2011). Propaganda theory (Marlin 2000)
2002) has implications for the variant perceptions that governments, politico-military institutions and civilians may have, compared with the terrorist organisation’s senior leadership. Propaganda theory also relates to the domestic bases of grand strategy (Mueller 2009; Deibel 2007) that might influence how counterterrorism, national security agencies, and other politico-military institutions formulate their strategies to end terrorist organisations (Cronin 2009). Terrorist organisations have also developed intelligence, counterintelligence and propaganda capabilities that might indicate strategic subcultures (Snyder 1977).

Political Psychology: Political psychology is an historical precursor to strategic culture that informed the first generation of theory-building (Snyder 1977; Gray 1999). It deals with profiling political and terrorist leaders (Post 1990; Post 2005; Post 2008; Lifton 1999) including personality, psychoanalytic character, trait and cognitive dimensions, leadership styles, and causal stories. To-date, counterterrorism has applied political psychology to study terrorist organisations which have attempted to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons (Lifton 1999; Hudson 2001; Murakami 2003). Political psychology illuminates micro-level mechanisms that strategic culture and organisational dynamics also consider at a meso-level. Adaptation of these mechanisms might reveal different explanations to the organisational dynamics literature.

Argumentation Analysis. Johnston (1995a; 1995b) highlighted the potential role that argumentation might have in a terrorist organisation’s decision elite, senior leadership, culture, and decision-making processes. Johnston mentions argumentation in his strategic culture definitions (Johnston 1995a: 36) but does not use formal methods. Argumentation analysis is a formal, structured approach to make causal, descriptive, explanatory and logical inferences about public statements, knowledge claims, rhetoric, and premises. Argumentation encompasses formal and logical methods (Besnard & Hunter 2008) and schemas or common patterns of deductive and inductive reasoning (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008). Argumentation analysis provides a formal method to surface inferences and claims made: they can be mapped to known patterns for deductive analysis and structured comparison. The other analytical methods (historical, intelligence, propaganda) provide filters to evaluate specific information. Argumentation structures for terrorist organisations can be inferred from communiqués, propaganda, interrogation transcripts, interviews, and other information sources. These may be ‘discoverable’ using various analytical methods (historical, intelligence, propaganda) and political psychology. Argumentation analysis might provide one basis for developing more rigorous methods of case-based reasoning. It would also address concerns about comparative hypothesis testing using competing theoretical frameworks (Desch 1998; Gray 1999; Haglund 2004; Glenn, Howlett & Poore 2004; Porter 2009; Glenn 2009). This process can potentially be open-ended and used in collaborative group and team-based research.

Integrating the Key Methodologies. Collectively, the above methodologies provide a rigorous study design to develop a strategic culture framework for analysing terrorist organisations, and to explore implications for strategic culture in three comparative case studies. An initial ‘discovery’ phase uses publicly available data (open source intelligence) and source analysis. Analytical methods (argumentation, historical, intelligence, propaganda) and political psychology are used to examine, weight, and evaluate specific claims the possibility and variances in types of strategic culture in terrorist organisations. National security and grand strategy strengthen the strategic dimensions and foundations of strategic culture. Historical analysis and political psychology provide insight into how to evaluate data; propaganda
analysis provides a filter; and intelligence studies and argumentation analysis both use structured techniques to analyse specific claims and inferences.

Research Design

Reference Models. Several existing studies from strategic culture, national security studies and the diffusion of military innovations served as reference models for this project. The existing studies combined analytical clarity with sophistication in research design and methods. Johnston (1995a) and Porter (2009) combine empirical and critical methods to analyse strategic culture. The first remains the sub-field’s benchmark doctoral dissertation whilst the second reflects awareness of how current events can shape historical and interpretative analysis. Martel’s (2006: 7-9) pre-theory of military victory shows how to link conceptual theories to historical case studies and policy analysis. Cronin (2009) addressed the third generation’s emphasis on doctrinal and institutional forces in the context of adapting to counter-insurgency campaigns and terrorist group demise. Horowitz’s (2010) examination of the diffusion of military innovations combines case studies with a mixed methods approach. Biddle’s (2004) study of military victory triangulates historiography, case studies, formal mathematical theory, statistical analysis and simulation. Each of these existing studies have suggested methodological insights and implications which are considered and explored below.

Case Study Design. The project uses a comparative case study method to examine variances in the possible strategic cultures of three terrorist organisations: Al Qaeda, Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo, and Colombia’s FARC-EP insurgent movement. To-date, case studies have been primarily descriptive and inductive: this ‘pilot’ project advances a more analytical, comparative approach. A blend of “disciplined configuative” and “heuristic” approaches (George & Bennett 2005: 75; Yin 2009) are used to compare the explanations from existing literature about each terrorist organisation’s decision elites, leadership, and decision pathway on the use of force with what a strategic culture approach would highlight. This builds on existing comparative work about strategic cultures (Glenn, Howlett & Poore, 2004) but uses strategic culture and terrorist organisation literature instead of a comparison with neorealist international relations theory (Desch 1998). A range of different epistemological positions and theory-building cycles may be considered (Glenn 2009; Johnston 1995a; Johnston 1995b).

Case Study Selection

I draw on a different evidence base for each terrorist organisation: scholarly literature, anthropological fieldwork, investigative journalism and reportage, and source analysis. Each of the comparative case studies has a body of scholarship that advances divergent hypotheses and explanations about terrorist organisation capabilities, strategy and long-term goals. The divergent, competing hypotheses have not addressed other claims in-depth and in a systematic manner. Each has been advanced by a different group of journalists, scholars, or counterterrorism analysts.

The potential case universe (George & Bennett 2005) could include many potential terrorist organisations. This could inform the development of a research program that would build sub-field links between strategic culture theorists/frameworks, national security and the study of terrorist organisations. The Irish Republican Army, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Kurdistan Workers Party are examples of groups that might closely fit the first generation model of
strategic culture (Snyder 1977; Gray 1999). The project’s focus on Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo and FARC-EP tests a range of divergent cases (Gerring 2012), and descriptive, causal, and explanatory mechanisms. Importantly, the selected cases may illustrate variance on the circumstances that a strategic culture might arise in a terrorist organisation, and the specific ways that this strategic goal can also fail.

The three comparative case studies are a small-N approach that will contrast existing theories and explanations with what strategic culture frameworks highlight. Any conceptual theory-building will be inductive from primary and selected secondary sources where possible, and is closer to a pre-theory (Martel 2006). Primary and selected secondary sources on the three chosen terrorist organisations exist; as does attack, event, and time series data from the United States based National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (http://start.umd.edu/start/) and Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict project (http://esoc.princeton.edu/). All three terrorist organisations appear to have been shaped also by the politico-military responses and strategic cultures of their host countries (Lantis 2002). Each also has senior leadership and decision elites (Johnston 1995a; Johnston 1995b) that have shaped the strategic intent; decision pathways; culture; and tactical repertoire.

Colombia’s FARC-EP insurgent movement has survived paramilitary groups, counterinsurgency campaigns, and targeted decapitation of its senior leadership (Cronin 2009). It best fits the strategic culture requirement for long-term organisational existence. Its involvement in coca narco-trafficking, kidnapping, civil-military conflicts and critique of Colombian business and politico-military elites creates a complex terrorist organisation that has eluded analysts (Leech 2011). FARC-EP’s leadership under Manuel Marulanda and Raul Reyes also had secret discussions with Venezuela’s Chavez Administration and thus became a political issue in regional Latin American diplomacy, prior to 2012 peace talks with Colombia’s Santos Administration (Smith 2011). Colombia’s evolving response to FARC-EP during the Pastrana, Uribe, and Santos Administrations also highlights changes in the country’s civil-military balance, politico-military institutions, and strategic subcultures.

Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo was short-lived but developed a rich ‘emic’ culture and religious worldview from syncretic sources. Academic interest in Aum has evolved from cultic to comparative religious studies. This ‘pilot’ project uses strategic culture frameworks, coding (Saldana 2009), and thematic analysis (Guest, MacQueen & Namey 2011) to reinterpret the interviews that psychohistorian Robert Jay Lifton (1999) and novelist Haruki Murakami (2003) conducted with Aum mid-level, low-level, and former renunciates. Aum founder Shoko Asahara’s syncretic use of Hindu Tantra and Tibetan Buddhist Vajrayana religious practices is reframed in terms of past religious violence (Dalton 2013). Recent critical assessments of Aum’s covert program to develop chemical and biological weapons, and to acquire Russian nuclear weapons, are also considered (Leitenberg & Zilinskas 2012).

Al Qaeda remains the most studied of post-September 11 terrorist organisations and the first noted by strategic culture theorists (Cronin 2003; Brenner 2006). Al Qaeda initially represented a domestic terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia before periods in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Investigative journalism has reconstructed the complex events prior to the September 11 attacks (Coll 2004); the Hamburg Cell’s planning of the attacks (Wright 2006); and the Bush Administration’s subsequent Global War on Terror (Bergen 2011). Contemporary literature on Al Qaeda as a terrorist organisation highlights senior leadership’s role in shaping strategic intent, culture, and worldviews (Herman & Sakiev 2011), and
religious belief systems as a cultural transmission structure (Blomberg, Gaibulloev & Sandler 2011).

**Case Study Selection and Theory-Testing.** However, each of the terrorist organisations chosen for comparative case studies also tests different aspects of a strategic culture theory. Al Qaeda tests the role of domestic bases of grand strategy in counterterrorism decision-making (Mueller 2009); the emphasis on senior leadership (Scheuer 2011); and the organisational coherence and state emulation hypotheses (Bergen 2011). FARC-EP suggests that organisational coherence can be adaptive; that strategic intent can encompass different and sometimes competing organisational structures and leadership; that state emulation is based partly on control of geographic regions and a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign using ‘localised’ goals (Leech 2011); and that cultural transmission may be have different forms (Distin 2011; Schonpflug 2009) which encompass and go beyond organisational dynamics approaches. Aum Shinrikyo tests the role of senior leaders (Post 2005) versus mid-level and lower-level members (Lifton 1999; Murakami 2003) who were unaware of compartmentalised biological and chemical weapons development programs; the influence of macrohistorical philosophies on Aum and leader Shoko Asahara (Galtung & Inayatullah 1997); the strategic planning and resource allocative goals of a terrorist organisation (Bower & Gilbert 2005); and how post-attack evaluations can change depending on the evaluative research program (Gerring 2012; Jervis 2010). Consequently, these selected terrorist organisations are more likely to identify the differential factors in a strategic culture theory and the potential variances in the causal, descriptive, and explanatory variables (Gerring 2012; George & Bennett 2005). This is a different outcome to simply selecting terrorist organisations that would ‘curve fit’ a strategic culture in order to prove a link with terrorist organisations. A more varied, new model or framework of strategic culture in terrorist organisations might result from the ‘pilot’ project.

**Analytical Variables.**

The project’s dependent variable is that the terrorist organisation has a strategic culture.

The following independent variables will be analysed:

**IV1** Terrorist organisation emergence, survival, continuity and cultural transmission of values and worldviews over time.

**IV2** An articulated, long-term strategic intent, purpose or goals (possibly as a grand strategy of ranked, ordered preferences) from a terrorist organisation’s senior leadership, a decision elite, or from specific group strategists.

**IV3** Terrorist organisational capabilities, culture, symbols, values and worldviews that are operationalised coherently to pursue the articulated, long-term strategic intent, purpose or goals.

**IV4** Terrorist organisation anticipation and reaction to the domestic grand strategy, strategic culture, and possible strategic cultures of their ‘host’ nation-state: the reciprocal interplay of how the nation-state has conceptualised the terrorist organisation as a national security risk, problem or threat --- and how the terrorist organisation responds.
A terrorist organisation attempts to emulate aspects of a nation-state’s strategic culture or strategic subcultures: government and politico-military structures, resource allocative capabilities, strategic communications, and social programs.

The ‘pilot’ project has four levels of confirmation regarding if a terrorist organisation has a strategic culture, or if the concept does not make sense in a meso-level context. The strong form of a strategic culture in a terrorist organisation means that the terrorist organisation meets the criteria suggested by strategic culture theorists including long-term survival, cultural transmission, organisational coherence, and strategic intent, goals, and purpose. The semi-strong form means that long-term survival and cultural transmission are met but that organisational coherence and strategic intent, goals and purpose might vary depending on lifecycle, recruit, and population ecology changes suggested by the organisational dynamics and terrorist organisation literature. The weak form suggests cultural transmission over several splinter groups and changes to the other criterion. Lastly, the dependent analytical variable might be rejected: the terrorist organisation does not have a strategic culture so its initial selection in the case universe was a ‘false positive’. This is a self-check on possible Type II errors (failure to reject a false null hypothesis or dependent variable). The research design acknowledges the potential role of cognitive biases in ‘at a distance’ research (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Kahneman 2011) and the value of post-mortem reviews (Jervis 2010).

**Discovery, Coding, and Analysis**

The ‘pilot’ project uses a three stage process: (1) a discovery phase of data collection; (2) a coding phase using some of the analytic techniques and proposed methodologies as filters; and (3) an analysis phase using argumentation analysis, intelligence analysis, and comparative case study analysis.

**Discovery Phase: Source Collection and Initial Analysis.** The existing literature and analytical theories on each terrorist organisation will be initially evaluated using historical research methods and source analysis (Trachtenberg 2006; Murray & Sennreich 2006). Field data from relevant research dissertations will be considered using anthropological research frameworks (Barnard 2000) to differentiate it from journalistic reportage, think-tank, and war college sources on terrorist organisations. Examples include the public statements of Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden (Ibrahim 2007; Kepel & Milelli 2010; Bergen 2011; Scheuer 2011) and interviews with mid-level, lower-level and former members of Aum Shinrikyo (Lifton 1999; Murakami 2003). The goal of this initial source analysis is to consider what the publicly available data (open source intelligence) reveals about each selected terrorist organisation. This is important to identify anchoring, confirmation, framing, representativeness and other potential psychological biases that may influence research interpretation (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Kahneman 2011). One specific filter to identify these cognitive biases is propaganda analysis (Marlin 2002; Jervis 2010).

The source collection will focus on several levels and layers of analysis about terrorist organisations: (1) the terrorist organisation’s history, evolutionary dynamics and internal coherence; (2) its interaction in a population ecology with other strategic actors including politico-military institutions in its host country, law enforcement, judiciary, intelligence agencies, and non-government organisations; (3) its senior leadership or decision elite; (4) its shared culture, collective symbols, and values and worldviews (5) individuals who may be ex-members or who may leave; (6) journalists who interview members of (3) and (5); and (7)
data that might be used for later content analysis using argumentation analysis, thematic analysis and propaganda analysis techniques of public statements. These approaches are outlined in the next phase of analysis.

Coding Phase. Pre-coding and initial coding will examine the strategic culture frameworks and theories on terrorist organisations discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. A grand strategy orientation will be considered for the terrorist organisation’s strategic intent and long-term, prospective goals. Collectively, this work will be decomposed into provision coding or meta-model for further analysis. Next, for each of the three chosen terrorist organisations a sample of publicly available data will be examined and coded. This may include publicly available communiques, interviews, and public statements; research dissertations; and reputable secondary sources. This material will be coded for the institutional sources where relevant as this may reveal potential cognitive biases such as anchoring, framing, and representativeness (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). In vivo, emotion, values, and versus coding will be applied to highlight terrorist voices and possibly using NVivo for electronic coding (Saldana 2009) or as a Microsoft Access database. Analytic memos will be written for practitioner development. A codebook and codelist will be developed.

The domain and taxonomic coding for strategic culture and terrorist organisation elements will include, where possible: (1) the terrorist organisation’s long-term strategic vision, intent and goals; (2) the terrorist organisation’s leadership or decision elite, and their tactical repertoire; (3) the terrorist organisation’s followers or membership; (4) intelligence insights on the terrorist organisation; (5) declarative statements or symbolic viewpoints articulated in communiqués and interviews which had propaganda elements, including requests to negotiate with government parties; (6) operational details of terrorist attacks and use of force, and their links to the terrorist organisation’s strategic goals and intent; (7) portrayal of adversaries and enemies; (8) deception and counter-intelligence strategies; and (9) the quality of the terrorist organisation’s coherence and structure, including their internal culture.

Analysis Phase: Thematic, Argumentation and Intelligence Analysis. Applied thematic analysis techniques will be used to examine the codebook and codelist as one outcome of the coding phase (Guest, MacQueen & Namey 2012). Argumentation analysis, schemas, and trees will be used as post-coding (Besnard & Hunter 2008; Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008) and to check for potential cognitive biases (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Kahneman 2011) about the terrorist organisations studied. Relevant causal and explanatory mechanisms may also be identified (Morgan & Winship 2007; Pearl 2009; Gerring 2012) to also test if a terrorist organisation has a strategic culture. Each comparative case study will be evaluated using the study’s major hypotheses including the strategic culture criterion as across-case comparison (George & Bennett 2005; Yin 2009). Hypothesis coding (for exploring theory comparison) and holistic coding (for exploratory analysis) may be considered. Explanatory differences between the existing literature on terrorist organisations and strategic culture approaches will be identified and discussed. The across-case comparison, codebook and codelist will finally be tested using intelligence post-mortem and retrospective techniques (Jervis 2010).

Study Weaknesses. This study has several weaknesses:

First, this ‘pilot’ project is a small-N study as part of a long-term research program. Examination of a larger number of cases would enable the further testing of analytical, causal, and explanatory variables, and potential causal relationships. A large-N study would
enable further examination of the larger case universe of terrorist organisations that might have a strategic culture.

Second, the research contains provisional conclusions and theories which may be re-evaluated on the basis of new evidence. Domestic restrictions on access to estimative intelligence from security agencies will affect the primary information that civilian researchers can make inferences from. This creates a ‘shadow’ effect: the use of intelligence and propaganda methods, and argumentation analysis, is designed to critically evaluate and to weight information in a Bayesian manner (Jervis 2010). The study relies on selected primary sources where possible, and a mixed methods, evaluative approach to secondary sources. However, there are crucial gaps in some of the comparative case studies that newly available primary sources could address.

Third, the comparative case studies impose several potential biases on the research and the project’s conclusions. The chosen terrorist organisations are geographically located: Al Qaeda historically in Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Afghanistan, and now in Iraq and the Islamic Maghreb; Aum Shinrikyo in Japan; and FARC-EP in Colombia. This geographic locale also shapes the media, government and military data sources used for the project. There are also linguistic constraints that a collaborative team approach with this expertise might address in a long-term research program.

Fourth, the project’s dependent variable is that a terrorist organisation has a strategic culture. The comparative case studies were chosen to highlight the range and variance of possible strategic culture and multiple strategic subcultures in terrorist organisations, and the availability of primary and selected secondary sources. However, this case study selection includes the possibilities that the terrorist organisations have some aspects but not all of the necessary and sufficient criteria for a strategic culture, or that they do not have strategic cultures. These possibilities could affect the ‘pilot’ project’s research findings.
Timeline For Completing Thesis

March 2013: Chapter 2 redraft on terrorist organisations to PhD Committee.

April 2013: Create initial coding for comparative case studies.

June 2013: Chapter 5 (Aum Shinrikyo) draft to PhD Committee.

September 2013: Chapter 4 (Al Qaeda) draft to PhD Committee.

November 2013: Chapter 6 (FARC-EP) draft to PhD Committee.

January 2014: Chapter 7 (Conclusions) draft to PhD Committee.

2014: Iterative redrafts of chapters to PhD Committee and coding.

January–June 2015: Final redrafts to PhD Committee; viva preparations; and sequencing of chapters for publication in appropriate academic journals.
Statement of Progress To Date

I began initial candidature in early March 2011 as a part-time HDR student.

To-date, I have written three draft chapters: ‘The Evolution of Strategic Culture’; ‘Origins and Visions of Counterterrorism Studies’; and ‘A Theory of Strategic Culture for Counterterrorism Studies’. Collectively, this is 30,000 words of draft material. I have another 20,000 words of draft ‘working notes’ for the three case study and conclusion chapters. The contribution to original research includes archival research on strategic culture theory-building; a different theory-building approach to Alastair Iain Johnston’s influential three generations framework; and the advancement of mixed methods research design to examine strategic culture. I have given two presentations to the annual Monash PSI Symposium: on my research topic (27th October 2011) and a confirmation of candidature presentation (26th October 2012).

I had two co-authored conference papers accepted for panels in the International Studies Association’s annual convention, to be held on 6th April 2013 in San Francisco. The two papers were ‘Australia’s Strategic Culture and Constraints in Defense and National Security Policymaking’ and ‘Complexity, Model Risk, and International Security’. I coordinated with Jeffrey Lantis (Wooster College, United States) to help develop the panel ‘Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region’ including gathering details of international experts for the panel and suggesting Patrick Porter (University of Reading, United Kingdom) who will be the panel’s respondent. However, I cancelled ISA conference attendance and panel participation in November 2012, due to difficulties in gaining conference travel funding, and to avoid a potential ISA blacklist for late cancellation. Journal articles from these planned ISA presentations and conference papers will be written for high-impact journals including the Australian Journal of International Affairs and the Australian Journal of Political Science.

A presentation on nuclear strategy theorists and cyberwar was accepted for Safeguarding Australia 2012, and scheduled to be given on 25th October 2012. However, the national security conference was cancelled on 11th October 2012 due to budget austerity.

I have joined the American Political Science Association, the International Studies Association, and the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations to build international collaborative networks and to be aware of relevant international research.

I have also posted comments throughout 2011 and 2012 on the Lowy Institute’s Lowy Interpreter blog (www.lowyinterpreter.org) on PhD relevant topics in order to become known to Australian-based international relations analysts and policymakers.
Brief Bibliography


List of Publications Produced During the Review of Candidature


Refereed Journal Articles


Contributions to Edited Book Anthologies


Conference Presentations


Expert Commentary


Online Publications

