Ethnopolitical Taxonomies

Alex Burns (alex@disinfo.com), November 2006

Abstract

This essay evaluates Robert Kaplan's "ancient ethnic hatreds" thesis on ethnic cleansing and genocide. It summarises the contribution of genocide studies, the psychology of genocide perpetrators, and the constructivist debate within international relations on intervention norms. The Balkans, Rwanda, the Congo and Serbia are used as case studies. Non-government organisations, the media, and international institutions have complementary roles in predicting and preventing genocides. Intelligence gathering on future genocides can be enhanced through the careful use of taxonomies, foresight methods, 'open source' collection, and recalibration of the 'force calculus' between hard and soft power.

Defining Genocide

Genocide emerged in the early 1990s as a 'wicked problem' for strategic analysts. Genocides in Rwanda, the Congo, and the Balkans forced analysts to re-evaluate the genesis, nature and drivers of political violence. All three cases challeged the international norms on the Westphalian sovereignty of nation-states, non-intervention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction.

When the Balkans crisis unfolded in 1992 it disrupted the post-Cold War view that genocide was ancient history. International jurist Raphael Lemkin first defined genocide in his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944) as the planned extermination of a collective group based on ethnic, cultural and linguistic collectivity.[1] Lemkin lobbied the United Nations which, after revelations of Nazi Germany's 'Final Solution' for the Jews, created the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). The UN defined genocide as "a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups" based on cultural, ethnic, linguistic and racial dimensions.[2] Stalin's fears about potential prosecution over the 1929-1932 kulakisation of Russian peasants meant the Convention's definition and scope was weakend.[3] However it could be used in conjunction with the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Nuremberg Principles (1946).

The Convention's ambiguity has created diverse definitions of genocide. Martin Shaw defines genocide as a "form of war in which social groups are the enemies."[4] Shaw incudes genocides as a subset of his "degenerate wars" that go beyond limits and attack civilians and host societies.[5] Tatz cites Dekmejian that the elements of genocide "include organisational specifity; planning; programming and timing; bureaucrstic efficiency and comprehensiveness; technological capability; and the ideological imperative."[6] Lawrence Kriesberg notes that genocide, like Fourth Generation warfare, is an asymmetrical conflict.[7]

In the mid-1990s the "ancient ethnic hatreds" emerged as a major media narrative to explain the Balkans genocide. Robert Kaplan's *Coming Anarchy* (2000) reflects primordialist and 'tragic' realist interpretations of culture, history and human nature.[8] *Slate* columnist Lucy Russell argues that the "ancient ethnic hatreds" thesis reflects the fears of U.S. isolationists about the international order.[9] Kaplan was correct in noting how group historical narratives become rigidly fixed yet incorrect that this historiography was ancient.[10]

The ethnic cleansing and genocides in Rwanda, the Congo and the Balkans disrupted the post-World War II viewpoint that genocide was ancient history Adolf Eichmann's trial in 1961 established the West's dominant image of the Nazis as genocide perpetrators.[11] Yet by the mid-1990s postmodernists had stripped the Nazi narrative of its traditional moralism and reinterpreted with an ironic gaze.[12] Lemkin's definition was not enough: nation-states rejected taking action if they felt unfolding incidents were not genocide.[13]

Genocide Studies

Genocide studies has struggled to gain academic legitimacy for prediction. Its interdisciplinary approach includes anthropology, political sociology, peace studies and postcolonial studies. Its subgenres include first-person travelogues and Foucauldian archaeologies of 19th century racialist philosophies and the colonialist 'white man's burden'. Its barriers include a lack of national interest, strategic pretext, lack of debate in scholarly journals, and fragmentation into 'second order' transnational issues. The Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the University of New South Wales is a major research centre.

The field offers several different explanations about genocide causation. Recent controversies include the 'intent to destroy' debate and apologetics about past 'ethnic cleansing' cases. Genocide is often portrayed as apocalyptic thinking that leads to societal destruction. The power to define genocide often means the power to define history. Genocide scholars have re-evaluated Turkey's massacre of Armenians (1915-

1917); the Khmer Rouge's 'Year Zero' in Cambodia (1977-1979); and NATO's bombing of Serbia in March 1999. Cases on the threshold of 'ethnic cleansing' and polticide include the Soviet kulakisation (1929-1932); Japan's 'Rape of Nanking' (1937); China's 'Great Leap Forward' (1959-1962); Indonesia's East Timor occupation (1975-1999); and the Aboriginal 'stolen generation' debate in Australia. Therefore a major Genocide Studies theme is the links between colonialism, identity politics, and nation-building. Another is how historical precursors influence the contemporary geostrategic context. Saskia Sassen notes, for example, that the demise of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires created "refugee flows" and "intra-Balkan antagonisms" that rivalled Yugoslavia's breakup in the early 1990s.[14]

Geostrategic Context and Transnational Issues

The mid-1990s wave of genocides occurred during a period of geostrategic transition.[15] For realists the genocides were pessimistic reminders of elite power, conflict, and quasi-states. Liberal internationalists warned of hypercapitalism and weakening of the international order. Neo-realists pointed to the failure of democratic polities to achieve dominance in genocide-prone societies. The genocides offered confirmation of global 'flows' and risk sociology. For Robert Kaplan, Howard Bloom and others, the apocalyptic dimensions of genocides mirrorred the 'pre-millennial tension' regarding U.S. militias and weapons of mass destruction. More problematic is that democratisation has accelerated some genocide incidents.[16]

Genocide remains a *problematique* because its impact "is global and multidimensional, dense and complex."[17] A whole-systems view of transnational problems is necessary because genocide can trigger cascades and emergent complexity at macro, meso, and micro levels.[18] Thus there are cross-fertilisation possibilities between counterterrorim and genocide studies, globalisation trends, and transnational issues. The counterterrorist discourse on technology proliferation has echoes in Genocide Studies research on small arms flows, sites of power, and systemic structures.[19] Michael Ignatieff and Mary Kaldor's interrogation of 'new wars' illuminates the quasi-state dynamics of the Balkans

and the Congo. The complex and multidimensional view of genocide can also be used to evalute specific explanations. For example, Ignatieff proposes that revival of "warrior's honour" could be used to prevent genocides. Martin Shaw counters that although Ignatieff has many examples—Vietnam in Cambodia's Khmer Rouge (1979), Tanzania in Uganda (1979) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Rwanda (1994)—each has created second- and third-order problems.[20] The UN and non-government organisations offer one alternative to relying on "warrior's honour."

Regrettably, understanding of the geostrategic context has often been obscured by political rhetoric. The Bush Administration interprets genocide as part of 'failing' and 'rogue' states rather than as a separate transnational issue.[21] (Finnemore, 2004, 137). This perspective also ignores the crucial role of private forces and paramilitaries in genocidal conflicts. Russia portrayed the Chechen conflict as part of the global War on Terror. U.S. think-tanks such as RAND and the Heritage Foundation reflect the ideological stance of their audiences. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri counter that genocide alongside nuclear weapons has been the hidden basis for Western geostrategic dominance.[22] These debates signify a shift in international norms.

International Norms

Genocide presents a crisis between cosmopolitans and ethnonationalists that is best understood by constructivist, rationalist, and world systems schools of international relations. The key international norms include geostrategic flows, humanitarian intervention, Westphalian sovereignty, and 'new wars'. Disagreements on these norms provide some explanation of why legal norms on genocide have been selectively applied. Interdisciplinary efforts and holistic models recognise that genocide creates problems—"refugee flows, social conflict, regional instability, and inter-state wars"—that spans transnational issues.[23]

Genocide is the major exception to non-intervention norms. The debate on humanitarian intervention has been a legitimation battle to establish normative rules and institutions at

the international level.[24] It has also been a fight against realist and neoliberal theories that do not provide adequate explanations for why interventions are necessary.[25] The debate created a political split in the U.S. between the "Christian Republican military ethos" and "Democrat humanitarian interventionists."[26] The intervention decision created problems for the Clinton Administration in Rwanda[27] and the the Blair Government in Kosovo.[28] This is despite the UN Genocide Convention's recognition that any regime who engages in genocide "forfeits its right to national sovereignty."[29]

Clinton and Blair believed that the Revolution in Military Affairs would provide solutions to humanitarian problems. They were thwarted by two problems. NATO's "technological mastery" in Kosovo led to a "virtual war" in which decision-makers became divorced from consequences and impacts.[30] In retaliation Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic used "refugee flows to destabilise neighbouring countries."[31] This 'tit-for-tat' response strengthened intervention norms to protect displaced and defenceless populations whilst delegitimating techno-military solutions. The resultant "organised hypocrisy" played out in the early 1990s Balkans, Rwanda in 1994, and NATO's Kosovo bombing in 1999.

The Balkans, Rwanda, and Serbia

Initial explanations of the 1992-1995 ethnic cleansing in Bosnia focused on Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic, European history, and propaganda as a mobilising force. Milosevic's 24 April 1987 speech and Kosovo Polje rally in 1989 are cited as key incidents.[32] Although "many former Communist elites reinvented themselves as ethnic nationalists" there are alternatives to Great Leader explanations.[33] Amy Chua contends that economic disparity between the northern states of Slovenia and Croatia, and the Southern states of Serbia were a more likely explanation.[34] Michael Ignatieff notes that Albania's economic transition and post-Communist problems were factors in the Kosovo Liberation Army's campaign against Milosevic in 1999.[35] The continuing debate situates ethnonationalist xenophobia in a deeper context that problematises democratisation.

The genocidal purge by Hutu Power of Tutsis in Rwanda was also explained initially by Kaplan's "ancient ethnic hatreds" thesis. The genocide began after General Juvenal Habyarimana's plane was shot down on 6 April 1994. Habyarimana was portrayed as holding Rwanda together after postcolonial independence had unleashed Hutu violence in 1960, 1961, 1963, and 1967.[36] Hutu Power's re-emergence in the early 1990s occurred against a backdrop of "sudden political liberalisation"[37] that included poverty, elite propaganda, and revised historiographies. The purge was also triggered by the Rwandese Patriotic Army, a Tutsi diaspora supported by neighbouring Uganda, which neared Kigali in 1993.[38] For Michael Mann, this meant the Rwandan regime lost control of its paramilitary forces and was unable to stop the escalation.[39] This mixture of security threats was more nuanced than explanations that relied solely on the 1933-34 Belgian census which created the "Hutu" and "Tutsi" ethnocentric categories. It also explains why the conflict mutated and spilled over into the Congo's civil war.[40]

The intervention failures in the Balkans and Rwanda illustrated the failure of international norms to regulate 'new war' conflicts.[41] NATO's Operation Allied Force, which bombed Kosovo for two months from 24 March 1999, was instead portrayed as an 'humanitarian' intervention by post-military society.[42] 'Tragic' realists vindicated the campaign as a bulwark against the specter of Fourth Generation Warfare between non-state actors.[43] Observations about "different histories" were now about contemporary worldviews than primordialist explanations.[44] Michael Ignatieff's preferred metaphor was from the complexity sciences: "Balkan physics was chaotically unpredictable. The war was the result of a double miscalculation."[45] Milosevic's was that NATO would return to the Dayton negotiating table, whilst "because the leaders of NATO still did not fully appreciate the strategic nature of genocide, they were politically unprepared to adopt the tactics necessary to achieve their goal."[46] Problems with the intervention decisions in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Kosovo have prompted further research on the psychology of genocide perpetrators.

The Psychology of Genocide

Genocide scholars are re-evaluating psychological explanations for genocide that parallels a similar debate in counterterrorism studies. Colin Tatz dismisses psychopolitical and abnormal psychology approaches as unusable in finding predictors.[47] The influence of innate aggression theories has waned, whilst Stanley Milgram's study of authoritarian personalities and Philip Zimbardo's 1971 prison experiment are still cited.[48] Profiling of genocide figures obscures the different perpretrator roles.[49] Mary Catherine Barnes and other recent scholars have developed a synthesis of cognitive, social learning, and identity factors that will reinvigorate the field.[50]

The dominant emphasis of psychological theories is on group dynamics and social psychology. Vamik Volkan's psychohistorical explanation is that the "regressed group" who engages in genocide may be obsessed with blood purity: "connected to the very conditions of its existence as a group with a specific shared identity."[51] Ervin Staub notes that genocide perpetrators are resocalised into a worldview with different norms and values, thus victims are situated outside the society's "moral universe".[52] Michael Ignatieff's neo-Freudian "narcissism of minor difference" counters Staub that most perpetrators and victims are very close, and that identity has to be recreated.[53] Scholars are yet to link past genocides to the motivations of contemporary terrorist groups. For example members of the Red Army Faction were mobilised by their guilt and rage over family involvement in Nazi Germany.[54]

Several areas require further research. Martin Shaw's observation that genocide perpetrators have "pseudo-scientific, irrational and fantastic beliefs" may connect psychological explanations to the political sociology of conspiracy theories.[55] Perpretrators have social images of utopias that would be early warning signals, although such imaginal work needs to be cleared of film imagery, sound-bites, and cliches.[56] Decoding these social images requires the ability to understand the lifeworlds of different political ideologies and motivations.[57] Finally, Barnes' work points toward a meta-

theoretical frame that would clarify perpetrator motivations in ethnic cleansing and genocide incidents.

Insights From Violence Research

Violence research offers parallel findings regarding the psychology and process of genocide. Researchers have developed theories of perpetrator objectives, the characteristics of genocide regimes, and the role of ethnic or in-group identity. Benjamin Valentino notes that only comparatively recently have researchers developed 'strategic logic' models of why genocide occurs.

Barnes defines a genocidal regime as "one that demonstrates its willingness to utilise the ultimate coercive power of annihilation to maintain its position and achieve its other aspirations."[58] Valentino distinguishes between three primary regime explanations: "social change and dehumanisation . . . scapegoat theory . . . [and] political opportunity."[59] Whilst Barnes distinguishes between political and economic reasons, Michael Mann has emphasised the latter in postcolonial genocides that involve theft as a major pretext. Michael Ignatieff notes rumours that Slobodan Milosevic's banks were involved in arms trading, smuggling, and black market oil.[60] Charles Tilly also emphasises the role of "violence specialists" who train the paramilitaries that carry out genocides.[61]

Early research emphasised "ethnic homogeneity" and "local culture" as defining relational characteristics of the perpretator in-group.[62] Donald Horowitz points to the risk of paramilitaries where there is "divergence between civilian and military ethnic compositions."[63] This research was based on assumptions of anxiety, power hierarchies, control of elite institutions, and intergroup conflict.[64] Tatz and others have shifted from elite groups who seize power, with or without mass support, to a web of multiple roles that includes perpetrators, victims, bystanders, benficiaries of genocide, and denialists. Michael Mann prefers a vertical structure of perpetrators, paramilitaries, and mass support.[65] Charles Tilly believes that diaspora can facilitate in-group networks.[66] Eric

Weitz has clarified that this involves a "dual process" at least, which involves how the perpetrator sense of autonomy and underlying regime frame interacts with others.[67] This dynamic social imaging, a variant on Benedict Anderson's "imagined community", helps explain why sub-groups can be mobilised. The critical factor is the shift from ideology to violence, which requires organisational capability and political will. For Tatz, Shaw, and Weitz genocide obliterates the distinction between combatant and non-combatant. Further research is required on coercive practices, pressganging of some genocide perpetrators, and the second order traumatisation of victims who are forced to torture others.

Nordstrom has pioneered a conflict anthropology that acknowledges the role that organised militias have played in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Congo-Zaire. Her work delineates how paramilitaries and genocide perpetrators have developed new economies that rely on instrumental violence. Maria Tumarkin's research into 'traumascapes', or social spaces of slaughter that have intergenerational and symbolic impacts, opens up new research possibilities.[68] Nordstrom and Tumarkin's insights are also captured in Hubert Sauper's harrowing film *Darwin's Nightmare* (2004).[69] Sauper discovered during an investigation of Lake Victoria's environmental problems that the Russian planes that exported the fish to European markets were also importing small arms for the Congo civil war. His film documents the nexus of arms flows, poverty, disease, religious manipulation and business opportunism in the region. Whilst Nordstrom and Sauper depict the same dystopian landscapes that exemplifies Kaplan's reportage, they show that these periphery zones are integrated into macro-level structures of globalisation and violence. Their work is the most convincing refutation of Kaplan's "ancient ethnic hatreds" thesis.

Genocide Taxonomies

Kaplan's "ancient ethnic hatreds" thesis is often presented as the eruption of tribalism and proximal violence constrained by the artificiality of territorial nation-states.[70] Federal state-based solutions have not always been successful.[71] Genocide scholars have

avoided this monological view by developing in-depth taxonomies for ethnic cleansing and genocide as specific forms of violence. Earl Conteh-Morgan notes different categories for genocide, that include revolutionary, ethnic purification, pragmatic, and decolonisation forms.[72] Bruce Valentino develops six different models that overlap with perspectives on guerrilla warfare, imperialism, and state terrorism.[73] These models can also be used to evaluate scholarship on genocide, which like counterterrorist studies has shifted from revolutionary to decolonisation and pragmatic forms. They also identify critical themes, such as the dominance of revolutionary and ethnic purification models in psychological explanations of genocide.

Three specific taxonomies provide conceptual frameworks for evaluating 'weak signals' of ethnic cleansing and genocide. William T. Vollmann's 'Moral Calculus' summarises variations on moral codes and justifications for violence that the author assembled during 23 years of ethnographic fieldwork and interviews.[74] His 'Moral Calculus' is useful for its vast scope and ability to grasp the 'simple rules' that coalesce to form the perpetrator worldview. Mary Catherine Barnes' 'Genocide Calculus' expands the usual focus on regime, historical, and ideological dimensions to include international, positional, and situational factors.[75] Barnes' criteria could be integrated into mid-term intelligence briefs, and used to surface the blind-spots and hidden assumptions that can thwart decision-makers in high-velocity situations. Finally, Ervin Staub has developed a continuum of perpetrator motivations that includes revenge for past massacres; targeting of sociopolitical opponents; in-group attacks on out-group threats; and tit-for-tat intergroup conflict.[76]

Vollmann, Barnes and Staub's taxonomies provide models that can structure data and 'weak signals' into patterns for further analysis. As models they may frame the situation dynamics being examined. Potentially, they could be used by strategists in a similar fashion to Herman Kahn's escalation framework by counterproliferation strategists in the Cold War. A detailed analysis of these taxonomies is beyond the scope of this essay. Furthermore, the models must be integrated into understanding other strategic actors, such as non-government organisations, the media, and international organisations.

Non-Government Organisations and 'Blue Rinse'

Michael Ignatieff and others have depicted how diplomats, humanitarian negotiators and coalitions of non-government organisations hover around the contours of genocide incidents. The viable "responses to complex humanitarian emergencies" have been more by NGOs than traditional military operations.[77] This trend supports the constructivist thesis that non-state actors are gaining leverage for decision-making on transnational issues. It also links genocide scholars to community development and peace studies. However because international norms are weak and enforcement is selective, NGOs remain vulnerable to delegitimation.[78]

The International Committee for the Red Cross and Human Rights Watch have become prominent in anti-genocide lobbying. Their traumascapes are 'new war' zones controlled by privateers and warlords. Amnesty International ignored refugee testimony for several years about Cambodia's Khmer Rouge regime.[79] NGOs operating in the Balkans and Rwanda have been augmented by UN forces from impoverished countries for whom "peacekeeping is a lucrative business."[80] Yet this relationship has been strained by the "blue rinse" process in which UN peacekeeping forces have been manipulated into difficult circumstances. Medicins Sans Frontieres and Oxfam attacked the UN for remaining bystanders at Rwanda's Kibeho refugee camp in 1994.[81] The UN's 'safe area' strategy was also destroyed during Serbia's siege of Srebrenica in June 1995.[82] Finally, Michael Ignatieff observes that NGOs have their own blind-spots about complex transnational issues: "we need to reflect on the potential for self-righteous irrationality which lies hidden in abstractions like human rights."[83]

The Media: Genocide and Compassion Fatigue

The media's relationship to genocide incidents pose three major problems: public misperception, editorial narratives, and counter-tactics by perpetrators. Current affairs and news coverage rarely provides the public with the background context or in-depth history for the public to be informed. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky built their

influential ‘manufacture of consent’ model through study of euphemism and doublespeak; incidents not reported by agenda-setting media; and a cross-comparison of reportage on Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge and Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor. Herman later applied the model to counterterrorism experts and think-tanks. Michael Mann observes a limit of these explanations is that propaganda is rarely one-way and not always taken at face value.[84]

Susan Moeller has documented how media coverage of genocides follows similar editorial narratives to assassinations and famines. These narratives rely on atrocity footage which creates a disconnected public who rapidly experience “compassion fatigue.”[85] Moeller’s research echoes Colin McInnes’ warning that ‘new war’ reportage often devolves into “spectator sport militarism.”[86] Sudan’s Darfur is the most recent example of a genocide that had a short half-life on the issues-attention cycle.

The 1991 Gulf War established the ‘CNN Effect’ as a major influence on policymakers about transnational issues. Piers Robinson argues that policymakers learnt during the mid-1990s incidents to reshape narratives on humanitarian intervention.[87] Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic have shown a third problem: using the media in psychological warfare to halt precision bombing attacks and reshape public opinion.[88] This confluence of factors creates a feedback loop that negates intervention decisions: it also leads to a “risk averse” and “circular” policymaking culture.[89] Ignatieff argues that “In virtual war the telephone lines stay open. You talk to your enemy as you fight him.”[90] However genocide problematises this assumption, because although ‘new war’ decision-makers may have access to enemy elites, they do not often have contact with the paramilitaries who carry out the pogroms. “Information failure” remains an ever-present risk.[91] International institutions and intervention forces must still adjust to this reality.

International Institutions

The genocide *problematique* is a 'known unkown' issue for many international institutions. It counters the liberal internationalist ideals of multilateral trade agreements and an enlarged democratic space with a corresponding ethic of global responsibility. It challenges neo-realist security advocates to consider the cross-cutting impacts of refugee flows and resources scarcity. Implementing the UN Genocide Convention remains a barrier for constructivists and rationalists to create new norms and viable international institutions.

Non-enforcement of the UN Genocide Convention for over 50 years has meant a credibility gap between rhetoric and reality. Despite the Convention's framing the "dichotomy betweehn civilisation and barbarism" still shapes state interventions in a self-interested manner.[92] The quagmire of the UN's Operation Continue Hope in Somalia and the 'Blackhawk Down' incident prevented timely intervention in Rwanda.[93] The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees does not monitor genocide as a human rights problem.[94] The UN still lacks core capabilities—multinational forces, peacekeeping intelligence, peacebuilding force projection—that are required to prevent future genocides. Although it has invoked the 'g-word' the United States has not intervened to prevent 'ethnic cleansing' in Sudan's Darfur beyond diplomacy. Security Council voting also limits UN intervention in other geostrategic hot-spots. The U.S. has opposed the International Criminal Court and UN jurisdiction out of national self-interest. Despite this, the UN has shifted its focus to peacebuilding missions, post-conflict rebuilding, and reconciliation commissions.

For theorists such as Amy Chua, the Washington Consensus institutions have also become implicated in genocide through structural reform programs. Chua warns that a "market dominant minority" will become the target of ethnonationalist hatred if the majority remains marginalised. For example, ethnonationalist propaganda surfaced in Indonesia during the 1997 Asian currency crisis. Yet as with the 'root causes' debate in counterterrorism discourse, many analysts feel uncomfortable in making explicit links

between neoliberal policies, ethnonationalist elites, and genocidal purges. Michael Mann counters that although she raises interesting points Chua's theory is "farfetched."[95] Chua's thesis is extended by world systems theorists who contend the post-Cold War wave of democratisation splintered states that bounded the core-periphery relationship. The near-term challenge will be to develop adaptive organisations that can 'enable' constructivist institutions, and recognise the leverage points in global flows.

Conclusion: Implications for Peacekeeping Intelligence

As a large group phenomenon, genocides can be foreseen and pre-empted.[96] They are often preceded by what Charles Tilly calls "signaling spirals."[97] Samantha Power notes that genocodes were foreseen in Cambodia, Iraq.[98]

This foresight is exemplified by General Romeo Daillaire, who spearheaded the UN's Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The UN had deployed peacekeeping troops to monitor the Arusha peace negotiations between the Hutu government and the Rwandese Patriotic Army. As the genocide began Daillaire requested "more troops, and a broader, stronger mandate" but was rebuffed by the UN Security Council.[99] The murder of 10 Belgian peacekeepers prompted the removal of most UN troops.[100] Clinton Administration policymakers misread the genocide as a civil war due to "a bias toward governments in power."[101] The "Blackhawk Down" incident of October 1993 in Somalia meant Clinton was averse to making an intervention commitment.

Dallaire's problem was that the UN Genocide Convention was too narrow to force the Great Powers to intervene beyond geostrategic self-interest and morality. The U.S. reliance on diplomacy and economic sanctions fails "to address the root causes of violence" in genocide, and are ineffective once the regime has launched a purge.[102] The ability to profile genocide leaders 'at a distance' has its uses but cannot solely be relied upon. Hussein and Milosevic developed sophisticated 'denial' strategies, nor does the profiling does not cover paramilitary forces that have been mobilised. NATO's decision in 1999 to bomb Kosovo involved leadership errors of escalation and mirroring.[103] This

essay proposes three solutions to the genocide *problematique*: multidimensional analysis of transnational issues; integrating foresight techniques into the intelligence cycle; and recalibration of the 'force calculus' between hard and soft power.

Transnational issues analysis needs to augment the focus on leaders and regimes with greater span and depth. A renewal of country and regional studies could summarise the salient economic, cultural, and social factors, together with the psychological dynamics of its political leaders, opposition, and non-state actors. The overlay of globalisation flows, risk sociology and anticipatory anthropology would integrate non-traditional factors such as arms flows, resources scarcity and alternate worldviews. Critical security studies has made some progress toward this goal. Kaldor and Nordstrom's groundbreaking anthropology of conflict zones shows that genocide must be considered within a web of interconnected transnational issues rather than alone. This multifactor approach is required, Michael Mann, contends, because genocide is never spontaneous but occurs due to emergent complexities.[104]

Without this map analysts are likely to misread genocide pre-signals as another problem or a past war.[105] Genocide poses source validation challenges, and the need to rely on human and open source intelligence gathering. This can be complicated if the analyst is in an organisational, under-resourced, or has other tasking priorities that deflect attention. NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1999 was due to organisational barriers. As Michael Ignatieff recounts, "Mid-level CIA analysts who warned that the target had been misidentified couldn't get their message into the targeting process in time. The maps were old, the identification two years out of date."[106] Other factors—the 'need to know' principle, the influence of special interest groups, policymaker politicisation of intelligence product, and short-term policy cycles—also present the analyst with barriers. For example, Australia's concerns about the Indonesian archipelago's instability overrode its commitment to East Timor's sovereignty.

Australia does not yet have an intelligence agency tasks to focus on emerging and long-term issues that may identify future genocides. Responsibility is currently shared

primarily between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Office for National Assessments. An initial step could be to integrate the relevant foresight methods and tools into the analytical stage of the intelligence cycle. Trend analyses and 'inevitable surprise' forecasts support this error by extrapolating the present and providing a snapshot of complex dynamics.[107] 'Wild cards' or 'low probability high-impact events' can identify some of the 'known unknowns', yet are usually science and technology-oriented.[108] Newer methods such as Causal Layered Analysis synthesise critical theory and worldview analysis that can help to uncover 'unknown unknowns'.[109] These methods can be augmented by Barnes' and Vollmann's taxonomies, which provide general overviews.

Efforts to predict genocide require greater use of 'open source' intelligence (OSI), which can gather country and region knowledge in a 'distributed' fashion. Propaganda and public statements can be monitored for dehumanising language, epithets and metaphors about the out-group, and ideologies that depict the victim group as a clear-and-present threat.[110] Political profiling should be expanded beyond the leadership to examine "the ideologies, goals, and interests of groups in or near political and military power – particularly in societies with weak or unstable political institutions."[111] Staub's perpetrator continuum, along with Tatz's web of different roles, can be integrated into social network analysis. OSI also has its weaknesses: Shaw notes that the "'intent to destroy' may be hidden" and so source validation is crucial where possible.[112]

Finally, genocide requires decision-makers and strategists to recalibrate the 'force calculus' chosen to deal with the crisis: the mix of diplomatic censure, economic sanctions, humanitarian aid, and military intervention. Diplomatic initiatives can be derailed by disinformation. Economic sanctions may deter a regime, but diminish in impact once a pogrom is underway. Genocide confronts decision-makers with the urgent need to act on ambiguous information. Joseph Nye advises that decision-makers must heed the UN Genocide Convention and use proportionality, regional actors, and international taskforces where possible.[113] Nye's conclusion is that ethnic cleansing and genocide are bound to the post-Cold War era of global change. "In a world of nearly ten

thousand ethnic and linguistic groups and only about two hundered states, the principle of self-determination presents the threat of enormous violence," Nye advises.[114] Successful efforts to prevent genocide recognise this, and go beyond narrowly defined national interests to value a global communitarian perspective.

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